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377 
JUDGES WHO SETTLE 
HILLARY A. SALE

 
ABSTRACT 
This Article develops a construct of judges as gatekeepers in corporate 
and securities litigation, focusing on the last period—or settlement stage—
of the cases. Many accounts of corporate scandals have focused on 
gatekeepers and the roles they played or, in some cases, abdicated. 
Corporate gatekeepers, like investment bankers, accountants, and lawyers, 
function as enablers and monitors. They facilitate transactions and enable 
corporate actors to access the financial and securities markets. Without 
them, the transactions would not happen. In class actions and derivative 
litigation, judges are the monitors and enablers. They are required to 
oversee the litigation arising from bad transactions and corporate 
scandals. Unlike other types of private law litigation, where the parties 
settle and have the case dismissed, judges must approve settlements of 
class actions and derivative litigation. They are actually charged with 
fiduciary responsibilities and control the exit stage, or settlement, of the 
litigation. As a result, the judges‟ job is to be a gatekeeper.  
The judges are not, however, doing their jobs. “Doing their jobs” 
requires actual scrutiny of the role of defense counsel and insurers, both 
of whom amplify agency costs. It also requires scrutiny of the settlement 
collusion between defendants and plaintiffs. Yet, traditionally both 
academics and the courts have failed to analyze those issues in the context 
of the costs of aggregate and derivative litigation. This Article provides a 
real cut at those issues. It then develops and explores principles for 
gatekeeping judges, which, if implemented, will decrease the agency costs 
of this type of litigation and ensure that the judges are actually functioning 
as the fiduciaries they are required to be.  
Securities and corporate laws and regulations rely on gatekeepers to 
provide merits reviews of corporate disclosures and transactions.
1
 
 
 
  Walter D. Coles Professor of Law and Professor of Management, Washington University 
School of Law. Thank you to Steve Bainbridge, Jack Coffee, Jim Cox, Kent Greenfield, Renee Jones, 
Don Langevoort, Jonathan Lipson, Richard Marcus, Donna Nagy, Frank Partnoy, Todd Pettys, Larry 
Ribstein, Laura Rosenbury, Peggie Smith, Randall Thomas, Bob Thompson, and David Webber for 
comments. Thanks for research assistance goes to Rebekah Raber and Howard Ruddell. 
 1. See, e.g., Escott v. BarChris Constr. Corp., 283 F. Supp. 643, 683, 688–89 (S.D.N.Y. 1968) 
(analyzing statutory causes of action against accountants, directors, and others as gatekeepers for 
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Accountants, lawyers, and investment bankers control access to financing 
and the securities markets. They certify documents and financials and 
ensure that corporate actors adhere to their fiduciary, disclosure, and 
other duties. Independent directors also combat agency costs, monitor 
their fellow corporate actors, and, in some cases, hire the other 
gatekeepers and ensure they do their jobs well. Thus, gatekeepers control 
market access directly—certified accountant reports are required for 
certain public filings
2—and indirectly through advice to clients or their 
companies. 
Many accounts of corporate scandals have focused on gatekeepers and 
the roles they played or, in some cases, abdicated.
3
 Corporate gatekeepers 
function as monitors and enablers. Judges oversee the private enforcement 
that arises from financial gatekeeping failures and scandals. They control 
access to settlements and therefore are also monitors and enablers. 
Although no one has previously identified them as gatekeepers, judges are 
assigned that role for certain types of litigation. They are not, however, 
doing the job well.  
This Article develops a construct of judges as gatekeepers and a set of 
principles to guide them in policing aggregate and derivative litigation. 
Part I provides an introduction to this type of litigation and the role of 
 
 
cleansing public filings); Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 881 (Del. 1985) (stressing value of 
investment bankers‘ role in providing fairness opinion to assist in valuing transactions). 
 2. See Securities Act of 1933, sched. A, paras. 25 and 26, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77aa(25), (26) (2000), 
and Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 17(e), 15 U.S.C. § 78q(e) (requiring independent public or 
certified accountant audits of financial statements). 
 3. See, e.g., JOHN C. COFFEE, JR., GATEKEEPERS: THE PROFESSIONS AND CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE (2006) [hereinafter COFFEE, GATEKEEPERS]; William W. Bratton, Enron and the Dark 
Side of Shareholder Value, 76 TUL. L. REV. 1275 (2002) (arguing that particularly high standards 
should be applied to accountant gatekeepers); John C. Coffee, Jr., Gatekeeper Failure and Reform: 
The Challenge of Fashioning Relevant Reforms, 84 B.U. L. REV. 301 (2004) [hereinafter Gatekeeper 
Failure]; Lawrence A. Cunningham, Beyond Liability: Rewarding Effective Gatekeepers, 92 MINN. L. 
REV. 323 (2007) [hereinafter Beyond Liability]; Jill E. Fisch & Hillary A. Sale, The Securities Analyst 
as Agent: Rethinking the Regulation of Analysts, 88 IOWA L. REV. 1035 (2003) [hereinafter Securities 
Analyst as Agent]; Sung Hui Kim, Gatekeepers Inside Out, 21 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 411 (2008); 
Arthur B. Laby, Differentiating Gatekeepers, 1 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 119 (2006); Jonathan 
Macey & Hillary A. Sale, Observations on the Role of Commodification, Independence, and 
Governance in the Accounting Industry, 48 VILL. L. REV. 1167 (2003) [hereinafter Commodification]; 
Hillary A. Sale, Banks: The Forgotten(?) Partners in Fraud, 73 U. CIN. L. REV. 139, 160–61 (2004); 
Andrew F. Tuch, Multiple Gatekeepers, 96 VA. L. REV. 1583 (2010); John C. Coffee, Jr., The 
Acquiescent Gatekeeper: Reputational Intermediaries, Auditor Independence and the Governance of 
Accounting (Columbia Law and Econ., Working Paper No. 191, 2001), available at http://ssrn.com/ 
abstract=270944 [hereinafter Acquiescent Gatekeeper]; John C. Coffee, Jr., The Attorney as 
Gatekeeper: An Agenda for the SEC, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1293 (2003); see also Michael J. Borden, 
The Role of Financial Journalists in Corporate Governance, 12 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 311 
(2007) (describing role of journalists in detecting and preventing fraud and analogizing to 
gatekeepers). 
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judges as agency cost monitors. Part II contrasts the “solutions” of this 
type of litigation with its costs, and explores an area not developed in the 
legal literature—the agency issues on the defendants‟ side of the cases. 
The development of the role of defense counsel and their collusion with 
plaintiffs‟ counsel illuminates the need for judges to perform their 
gatekeeping role. Part III explores the role of judges in aggregate 
litigation, including their fiduciary responsibilities as monitors of the 
agency costs inherent in these cases. The judicial role maps to the role of 
gatekeepers more generally. The focus of this Article is on gatekeeping for 
the “exit mechanism,” or settlement stage of these cases.4 To develop this 
gatekeeping role, this Article examines a set of cases in which judges 
engaged in some gatekeeping, as well as incentives for gatekeeping and 
for shirking.
5
 Part IV then presents a set of gatekeeping principles that 
judges can deploy to decrease agency costs and improve the effectiveness 
of the litigation overall. Part V concludes. 
I. GATEKEEPING AND AGGREGATE LITIGATION 
Aggregate litigation is a solution to gaps in the legal system. 
Administrative law, for example, provides a partial solution to the 
problems of individual consumers who have insufficient incentives to 
pursue claims on their own.
6
 Resources, however, are unavailable to deal 
with all of the claims and concerns; thus, private litigation steps in to 
provide ―group redress.‖7 The system is not unified and the result is 
considerable diversity in outcomes. Scholars have focused extensively on 
 
 
 4. Judges also control initial access to courts through pleading standards and class certification. 
See Private Securities Litigation Reform Act (―PSLRA‖), Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (1995) 
(codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(2), (3) (2000)) (codifying the heightened pleading standard in private 
securities fraud actions); FED. R. CIV. P. 23 (governing the procedure for class actions); see also 
Richard Marcus, Reviving Judicial Gatekeeping of Aggregation: Scrutinizing the Merits on Class 
Certification, 79 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 324 (2011) (analyzing judges‘ role at class certification stage). 
 5. Financial gatekeepers face actual liability when they fail to perform. See, e.g., Reinier H. 
Kraakman, Gatekeepers: The Anatomy of a Third-Party Enforcement Strategy, 2 J. L. ECON. & ORG. 
53 (1986) (analyzing gatekeeper liability) [hereinafter Kraakman, Gatekeepers]. In addition, 
reputational liability for financial gatekeepers was long assumed. See COFFEE, GATEKEEPERS, supra 
note 3, at 3. This assumption is subject to debate, but still undergirds the laws and regulations. See 
Gatekeeper Failure, supra note 3, at 308–11; John C. Coffee, Jr., The Attorney as Gatekeeper: An 
Agenda for the SEC, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1293, 1300–02 (2003); Beyond Liability, supra note 3, at 
342–52; Securities Analyst as Agent, supra note 3, at 1078–80; Commodification, supra note 3, at 
1167–70; Acquiescent Gatekeeper, supra note 3. 
 6. See Harry Kalven, Jr. & Maurice Rosenfield, The Contemporary Function of the Class Suit, 8 
U. CHI. L. REV. 684, 684–86 (1940). It can remedy some problems with injunctions or stop orders. Id. 
at 685. 
 7. See id. at 686. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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the problems and solutions of class actions and aggregate litigation. This 
Article examines two key forms of litigation for corporate and securities 
law—class and derivative actions, focusing on the settlement stage.  
The class action has evolved considerably since the 1940s, when Harry 
Kalven and Maurice Rosenfield first wrote about it,
8
 but it remains an 
important part of the enforcement mechanism for corporate and securities 
laws. It is a procedural mechanism available when there is both an 
underlying substantive claim and when the proposed class of plaintiffs 
meets certain specifications under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 23 
or its state law equivalent. Derivative litigation, in which shareholders 
attempt to sue on behalf of the company, does not take the form of a class 
action because the plaintiffs are attempting to represent the company, not 
themselves. It does, however, bear similarities to class actions and is 
subject to some of the same procedural rules, as set forth under Federal 
Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 23.1 or its state law equivalent. Thus, for the 
purposes of this Article, the terms class or aggregate litigation refer to both 
traditional class actions and derivative litigation.  
The literature is filled with complaints and concerns about fiduciary 
issues, agency costs, and other problems at all stages of aggregate 
litigation.
9
 This Article focuses on corporate and securities litigation, 
providing a brief summary of those issues. The focus is on the fiduciary-
like role that judges play at the settlement stage of corporate and securities 
litigation. These cases are unique. They have specific procedural 
provisions for federal securities claims and derivative claims. These 
features were designed to help curb agency problems and to increase the 
judicial role in combating them. In addition, the injuries in these cases, 
unlike mass torts, for example, are financial, and, therefore, sometimes 
receive less attention than they ought.
10
 Finally, the agency problems in 
these cases are similar to the agency problems in the corporate 
organizations where the underlying violations occur. Indeed, the 
underlying agency problems are part of the reason why judges end up with 
the gatekeeping task.  
In addition to the extensive analysis of the costs of aggregate litigation, 
the legal literature is filled with proposed solutions, ranging from 
 
 
 8. See supra note 6; see also Richard A. Nagareda, Class Actions in the Administrative State: 
Kalven and Rosenfield Revisited, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 603 (2008). 
 9. See infra note 27. 
 10. See In re Elscint, Ltd. Sec. Litig., 674 F. Supp. 374, 381 (D. Mass 1987) (―Both traditionally 
and currently, legal protection for financial loss not accompanied by physical harm is less 
expansive.‖). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol89/iss2/3
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introducing intermediate advocates—like a guardian ad litem—for classes 
of individuals, to eliminating causes of actions entirely, to encouraging 
plaintiffs who were harmed by insufficient settlements to sue their former 
attorneys, to giving the SEC the power to oversee and prescreen securities 
causes of action.
11
 Focusing on the settlement stage and the specific 
fiduciary role assigned to the judges who review and permit settlements, 
this Article examines the gatekeeping role of judges as the enablers of 
settlements. Unlike other types of private litigation, these settlements 
require judicial approval.
12
 The judges are prescribed a fiduciary-like role 
to make determinations about settlements before allowing them to 
proceed. I argue that judges are required to perform this role. Then, I 
develop a construct of judges as gatekeepers and create a set of principles 
to provide guidance to them.  
II. THE SOLUTION AND COSTS OF AGGREGATE LITIGATION 
Delaware common law reveals that the fiduciary duties of directors and 
officers are enforced through private litigation.
13
 The system relies on 
private attorneys to take the lead. Delaware is not alone. The federal 
securities regime also relies on private attorneys to supplement 
enforcement.
14
 In both situations, plaintiffs‘ attorneys bring the cases and, 
if successful, receive fees for doing so. These cases, like class-action and 
aggregate litigation generally, are responses to what is otherwise a 
systemic failure. As the Supreme Court explained in Deposit Guaranty 
National Bank of Jackson, Miss. v. Roper: 
The aggregation of individual claims in . . . a classwide suit is an 
evolutionary response to the existence of injuries unremedied by the 
regulatory action of government. Where it is not economically 
 
 
 11. See infra note 30. 
 12. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e) (settlements of class actions require judicial approval before they 
become effective).  
 13. See N. Am. Catholic Educ. Programming Found., Inc. v. Gheewalla, 930 A.2d 92, 101 (Del. 
2007) (discussing the enforcement of directors‘ fiduciary duties through derivative actions by 
shareholders, and in some cases, creditors); Agostino v. Hicks, 845 A.2d 1110, 1115–16 (Del. Ch. 
2004) (describing the private shareholder‘s derivative action as ―an ingenious device to police the 
activities of corporate fiduciaries‖). 
 14. See, e.g., Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, Securities Class Actions as Pragmatic Ex Post 
Regulation, 43 GA. L. REV. 63 (2008) (arguing that ex post securities litigation is part of attractiveness 
of a relatively deregulated U.S. market with low entry costs); John C. Coffee, Jr., The Regulation of 
Entrepreneurial Litigation: Balancing Fairness and Efficiency in the Large Class Action, 54 U. CHI. 
L. REV. 877 (1987); Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Plaintiffs‟ Attorney‟s Role in Class 
Action and Derivative Litigation: Economic Analysis and Recommendation for Reform, 58 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 1 (1991) [hereinafter The Plaintiffs‟ Attorney]. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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feasible to obtain relief within the traditional framework of a 
multiplicity of small individual suits for damages, aggrieved 
persons may be without any effective redress unless they may 
employ the class-action device.
15
 
Aggregate litigation, then, provides the potential for remedies, 
recoveries, and enforcement in situations that might otherwise escape 
review.
16
 Absent the aggregate litigation mechanisms, corporate and 
securities-related fraud and fiduciary breaches would go unredressed 
largely for two reasons. First, government resources are insufficient to 
pursue all of the potential cases.
17
 Although the Securities and Exchange 
Commission has a large enforcement division, the staff is not sufficient to 
investigate and pursue all of the potentially fraudulent situations. As a 
result, private litigation is actually the ―primary vehicle‖ for securities and 
corporate enforcement.
18
 The existence of these cases, then, increases 
incentives for corporate actors to fulfill their disclosure and fiduciary 
duties or, put another way, helps to deter bad acts.
19
  
Second, the available damages in most securities and corporate cases 
on an individual basis—or in the case of derivative litigation, recovery for 
the corporation—do not provide an incentive for plaintiffs to pursue 
matters on their own. Many shareholders hold an insufficient number of 
shares to make it worthwhile for them to pursue fiduciary or securities 
breaches individually. Aggregation through derivative or class-action 
claims, with potential attorneys‘ fees, allows for litigation.20 Thus, the 
 
 
 15. 445 U.S. 326, 339 (1980). 
 16. See, e.g., HERBERT B. NEWBERG & ALBA CONTE, NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS § 22–6 (3d 
ed. 1992) (stating that both ―[t]he SEC and the judiciary have recognized that the class action may be 
the only meaningful and viable method by which securities investors may remedy their claims‖).  
 17. Securities Investor Protection Act of 1991: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Securities of the 
S. Comm. on Banking, Hous. and Urban Affairs on S.1533, 102d Cong. 15–16 (1992) (testimony of 
then-SEC Chair, Richard C. Breeden, that given budget limitations, private attorneys ―perform a 
critical role in preserving the integrity of our securities markets‖). 
 18. Common Sense Legal Reform Act: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Telecomm. and Fin. of 
the House Comm. on Commerce, 104th Cong. 1 (1995) (statement of then-SEC Chair Arthur Levitt). 
 19. See, e.g., H.R. CONF. REP. NO. 104-369, at 30–32 (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
730, 730–32 (stating that private litigation deters future wrongdoing by corporate actors and helps 
ensure they do their jobs properly). 
 20. Janet Cooper Alexander, Contingent Fees and Class Actions, 47 DEPAUL L. REV. 347, 347–
48 (1998) (stating that contingent fees are the ―nearly universal‖ type of compensation for plaintiffs‘ 
lawyers in aggregate litigation, and that ―no other form‖ is practicable). Aggregate litigation also evens 
the playing field by providing economies of scale for plaintiffs that the defendants already enjoy. As 
Professors Hay and Rosenberg explain, defendants have the incentive and will to spend more on 
individual cases than plaintiffs who are litigating separately do. The defendants, who could face 
several individual cases, can plan their litigation strategy by treating all potential plaintiffs as a de 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol89/iss2/3
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underlying principle of the class action is to ―overcome‖ incentive 
problems resulting from individually small recoveries by ―aggregating the 
relatively paltry potential recoveries into something worth someone‘s 
(usually an attorney‘s) labor.‖21 Aggregation, then, provides a solution to 
what is commonly referred to as a collective-action problem inherent in 
shareholder litigation. It makes otherwise ―unmarketable‖ claims 
―marketable.‖22 By doing so, it creates an enforcement mechanism for 
plaintiffs. 
Aggregate litigation also benefits defendants. Although they complain 
about aggregate litigation and make strong arguments against the 
certification of particular classes,
23
 an aggregate settlement protects 
defendants from repeated litigation on the same issues because it can bind 
all class members.
24
 The effect is to prevent future cases on the same set of 
facts. Preclusion of this sort is very valuable to defendants, and a court-
approved settlement agreement buys it.
25
 Thus, settlement is important to 
both sides.
26
 
 
 
facto class. See Bruce Hay & David Rosenberg, “Sweetheart” and “Blackmail” Settlements in Class 
Actions: Reality and Remedy, 75 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1377, 1383–85 (2000).  
 21. Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 617 (1997) (quoting Mace v. Van Ru Credit 
Corp., 109 F.3d 338, 344 (7th Cir. 1997)).  
 22. Nagareda, supra note 8, at 604. 
 23. See, e.g., In re Loewen Grp. Inc. Sec. Litig., 233 F.R.D. 154, 168 (E.D. Pa. 2005) (certifying 
securities fraud class action after rejecting numerous arguments by defendants that the requirements of 
Rule 23 were not met); Rowe v. Morgan Stanley Dean Witter, 191 F.R.D. 398, 406–16 (D. N.J. 1999) 
(granting defendant‘s motion to dismiss securities class action claims because the requirements for 
certification were not met); Endo v. Albertine, 147 F.R.D. 164, 166, 171 (N.D. Ill. 1993) (certifying 
securities fraud class action after rejecting defendants argument that the claim was ―riddled with fatal 
defects‖ that prevented certification); see also Todd G. Buchholz, Lawyers v. S&P 500, U.S. 
CHAMBER INSTITUTE FOR LEGAL REFORM (2002), http://www.instituteforlegalreform.org/get_ilr_doc 
.php?docId=1039Todd (complaining more generally about the ―tidal wave of class action litigation‖ 
and its harmful effects on corporations). 
 24. See Tice v. Am. Airlines, 162 F.3d 966, 968 (7th Cir. 1998) (noting that defendants argue 
that ―a new group of plaintiffs is barred from bringing an action since the plaintiff in an earlier suit was 
its ‗virtual representative‘‖); see also FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(3) (providing that judgments in mandatory 
class actions must ―include and describe‖ the class members, and in the case of (b)(3) class actions, 
―include and specify or describe‖ class members who were properly notified and did not opt out); id. at 
23(e)(1) (requiring notice ―to all class members who would be bound by the proposal‖). 
 25. See Nagareda, supra note 8, at 605 (characterizing preclusion as a commodity in business 
transactions); see also Samuel Issacharoff & Richard A. Nagareda, Class Settlements Under Attack, 
156 U. PA. L. REV. 1649 (2008) (examining preclusion and attacks thereon in class-action context). 
 26. A 1996 study of class actions in federal court revealed that defendants either acquiesced or 
stipulated to class certifications in 50 percent of the cases studied. See Thomas E. Willging et al., An 
Empirical Analysis of Rule 23 to Address the Rulemaking Challenges, 71 N.Y.U. L. REV. 74, 117–18 
(1996).  
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Legal solutions, however, often present new problems, and aggregate 
litigation is no different.
27
 At issue here are a series of ―gaps‖ between the 
―parties,‖ the lawyers, and the check-writers—generally, the insurers, but 
sometimes the corporations. On the plaintiffs‘ side, the thousands of 
shareholders, their class representatives, and the lawyers face 
communication and other issues. On the defendants‘ side, the incentive to 
settle is complicated by the typical funding sources. In short, settlements 
are rarely supported by personal contributions. Instead, corporate and 
insurer payments result in agency costs.  
These agency problems are not unlike those inherent in corporate law 
and the separation of ownership and control more generally.
28
 
Shareholders have stakes too small to engage in regular monitoring of the 
fiduciaries charged with running the corporations and issuing the 
disclosures. Those small stakes are at the root of the incentive problem 
that prevents them from litigating in the first place. They influence the 
attorney-client relationship as well. The representative plaintiffs arguably 
have investments insufficient to ensure active monitoring of the class 
lawyers‘ performance or much, if any, participation in the litigation other 
than what is required. The stakes also are too small to ensure they monitor 
their attorneys‘ fees.29  
 
 
 27. For articles detailing the agency problems in aggregate litigation generally, see John C. 
Coffee, Jr., Class Action Accountability: Reconciling Exit, Voice, and Loyalty in Representative 
Litigation, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 370 (2000) [hereinafter Class Action Accountability]; John C. Coffee, 
Jr., Class Wars: The Dilemma of the Mass Tort Class Action, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 1343 (1995) 
[hereinafter Class Wars]; Samuel Issacharoff, Class Action Conflicts, 30 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 805 
(1997); Susan P. Koniak & George M. Cohen, Under Cloak of Settlement, 82 VA. L. REV. 1051 
(1996); The Plaintiffs‟ Attorney, supra note 14; see also Richard A. Epstein, Class Actions: 
Aggregation, Amplification, and Distortion, 2003 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 475, 480–92 (describing costs and 
benefits of aggregate litigation and its potential for distortions). Aggregation distortions, while not 
absent in securities and corporate claims, are not as serious as in other situations in which Congress 
has, for example, provided a claim that envisioned individual litigation but that can be aggregated. 
That type of situation can create a massive aggregate claim. See Richard A. Nagareda, Aggregation 
and its Discontents: Class Settlement Pressure, Class-Wide Arbitration, and CAFA, 106 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1872, 1885–87 (2006) (describing proposed class of claimants under Cable Communications 
Policy Act of 1984 who had individual statutory remedies available at $1000 per plaintiff which, when 
aggregated in a class of 12 million, created potential damages of $12 billion). 
 28. See, e.g., Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial 
Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305 (1976); see also Donald C. 
Langevoort, The Human Nature of Corporate Boards: Law, Norms, and the Unintended Consequences 
of Independence and Accountability, 89 GEO. L.J. 797, 802 (2001) (analyzing board‘s monitoring 
functions as at ―the heart of what the agency cost model of the firm identifies as the central role for the 
board‖ preventing shirking and overreaching). 
 29. The PSLRA included a lead-plaintiff provision designed to help close this gap by statutorily 
preferring plaintiffs with larger stakes and presumably greater incentives to monitor. See Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934 § 21D(a)(3)(B)(i), 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(a)(3)(B)(i) (2000) (providing that ―the 
court . . . shall appoint as lead plaintiff the member or members of the purported plaintiff class that the 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol89/iss2/3
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Settlement magnifies the agency issues and costs.
30
 Consider the 
potential conflict between the class representatives, or lead plaintiffs in 
securities litigation, and the class attorneys. The attorneys generally take 
these cases on the basis of a hoped-for return, or on contingency, 
advancing the costs of litigation along the way. As a result, a smaller 
settlement with a ―higher ratio to the cost of the work than a much larger 
recovery obtained only after extensive discovery, a long trial and an 
appeal,‖ can be attractive.31 Thus, the attorneys may prefer to settle rather 
than go to trial, even if holding out or going to trial would result in a larger 
payment for the shareholders. Additionally, both the attorneys and 
representative plaintiffs may prefer settlement to save time and ensure 
some return, but the remaining members, who are not expending money or 
time, may have an interest in pursuing the litigation for a longer period in 
the hopes of a larger settlement.  
Rather than providing the assumed adversarial balance, the defendants 
contribute to these problems. Generally, defendants want ―peace.‖32 If they 
have done wrong, they want out sooner. If they have not, they still want 
out. After all, litigation imposes transaction and opportunity costs; a day 
spent in a deposition is a day lost to the corporation.  
 
 
court determines to be most capable of adequately representing the interests of class members‖). 
Recent empirical evidence indicates that it may have started to work in some cases. See James D. Cox 
et al., There Are Plaintiffs and . . . There Are Plaintiffs: An Empirical Analysis of Securities Class 
Action Settlements, 61 VAND. L. REV. 355, 367–80 (2008) (concluding post-PSLRA lead plaintiffs add 
substantial value to settlements); cf. James D. Cox & Randall S. Thomas, Leaving Money on the 
Table: Do Institutional Investors Fail to File Claims in Securities Class Actions?, 80 WASH. U. L.Q. 
855, 871–75 (2002) (discussing the role of institutional investors as lead plaintiffs in securities class 
actions); David H. Webber, Is “Pay-to-Play” Drawing Public Pension Fund Activism in Securities 
Class Actions? An Empirical Study, 90 B.U. L. REV. 2031 (2010) (investing lead plaintiff provision in 
context of pay-to-play allegations). 
 30. Many articles discuss settlements and agency costs and solutions. See, e.g., Alexandra Lahav, 
Fundamental Principles for Class Action Governance, 37 IND. L. REV. 65, 128 (2003) (advocating an 
active adversarial process during fairness hearings, ―a kind of trial on the merits of the settlement‖) 
[hereinafter Fundamental Principles]; id. at 136 (discussing the use of magistrate judges in negotiating 
settlements); Amanda M. Rose, Reforming Securities Litigation Reform: Restructuring the 
Relationship Between Public and Private Enforcement of Rule 10b-5, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 1301, 
1354, 1363 (2008) (developing an ―oversight approach‖ for the SEC in 10b-5 cases); William B. 
Rubenstein, The Fairness Hearing: Adversarial and Regulatory Approaches, 53 UCLA L. REV. 1435, 
1452–66 (2006) (examining various proposals for reducing agency costs at the settlement stage, 
including use of devil‘s advocates). In addition, agency cost concerns have been explored at some 
length in the literature on class certification and settlement classes, or classes certified solely for 
settlement purposes. See, e.g., Class Action Accountability, supra note 27, at 372–73. Those concerns 
and arguments have some salience here, but the focus of this paper is different. I am interested in the 
context of settlement approval generally.  
 31. Saylor v. Lindsley, 456 F.2d 896, 900 (2d Cir. 1972). 
 32. Neil Gorsuch, Panel 2: Tools for Ensuring that Settlements are “Fair, Reasonable, and 
Adequate”, 18 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1197, 1205 (2005). 
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If the plaintiffs have a strong case, the defendants know it before the 
plaintiffs. That informational advantage allows them to assess the claims 
better than the plaintiffs. Avoiding damages and reputational harm and 
gaining preclusion all provide an incentive to settle. Indeed, in corporate 
and securities litigation, the specter of personal liability, even though rare, 
adds to the incentive to settle.
33
 The plaintiffs, of course, might do better 
by holding out and not settling.  
Even if the defendants believe that the allegations lack merit, when the 
plaintiffs‘ claims survive a motion to dismiss, the risk of a trial and the 
possibility of a bad outcome increase. Defendants who did ―no wrong,‖ 
but made a bad decision, prefer not to take the stand and try to explain the 
decision away. A claim that lacks merit can still result in a jury finding of 
liability, which would be subject to an insurance-policy exclusion. Even 
without liability, trials are expensive and settling can reduce litigation 
expenses. The defendants, therefore, have many incentives to settle.
34
 
Indemnification and insurance complicate the defendants‘ agency 
costs. First, although defendants want to settle, they have almost no stake 
in how the settlement amount is split between the plaintiffs and their 
lawyers. After all, if they are not paying out of pocket, settlement is 
―easy.‖35 Settlements within the policy limits are therefore prized by all 
parties.
36
 Indeed, the evidence reveals that few defendants ever pay their 
own defense costs or settlements.
37
 Companies indemnify them and 
retrieve the costs from insurers.
38
 With the defendants twice removed from 
any payments, the insurers become the de facto monitors.
39
  
 
 
 33. See Waltuch v. Conticommodity Servs., Inc., 88 F.3d 87 (2d Cir. 1996) (holding that 
indemnification is not appropriate where conscious misconduct/bad faith is at issue). 
 34. See Paul G. Mahoney, The Development of Securities Law in the United States, 47 J. ACCT. 
R. 325, 332–37 (2009) (discussing defendants‘ incentives). 
 35. See Tom Baker & Sean J. Griffith, How the Merits Matter: Directors‟ and Officers‟ 
Insurance and Securities Settlements, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 755, 798 (2009) [hereinafter How the Merits 
Matter] (noting that insurers and defense counsel alike understand that settlement with insurance 
money is ―easy‖ because it is someone else‘s money); see also DOUGLAS LAYCOCK, MODERN 
AMERICAN REMEDIES 951 (Aspen 3d ed. 2002) (defendants care only about bottom line, not how it is 
split between plaintiffs and their lawyers). 
 36. See How the Merits Matter, supra note 35, at 806 (noting that plaintiffs‘ lawyers are willing 
to settle within the limits and defense counsel agree). 
 37. Bernard Black et al., Outside Director Liability, 58 STAN. L. REV. 1055, 1068–76 (2006) 
(between 1980 and 2004, outside directors made out-of-pocket payments in only thirteen settlements, 
eight of which were securities cases, with notables including Worldcom and Enron). 
 38. See Tom Baker & Sean J. Griffith, The Missing Monitor in Corporate Governance: The 
Directors‟ & Officers‟ Liability Insurer, 95 GEO. L.J. 1795 (2007) [hereinafter The Missing Monitor]. 
 39. Chris Guthrie & Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Insurers, Illusions of Judgment & Litigation, 59 
VAND. L. REV. 2017, 2020–21 (2006) (finding preliminarily that insurers tend to make more rational 
decisions than other litigation participants).  
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Second, the insurers are not good monitors. They do not monitor 
corporate governance significantly at issuance or during the life of the 
insurance contract.
40
 They do not set fees in accord with it. They do 
monitor litigation, and their focus is on their investment return and not, 
generally, on the validity of the litigation.
41
 Instead, they provide the 
insureds with a ―blank checkbook‖ to cover defense costs.42 Those costs 
have a settlement impact. They decrease the amount left for the plaintiffs. 
Thus, as defense costs increase, available policy funds decrease, and the 
plaintiffs‘ interest in settlement increases, regardless of the merits of the 
case.
43
  
Third, insurers are conflicted. They rarely push back on clients, 
because they do not want to lose business.
44
 Their real focus is protecting 
their investment. Indeed, insurers are loath to refuse proposed settlements 
because if they make the incorrect call, they risk litigation and liability 
themselves.
45
 As a result, the insurers are vulnerable to collusion between 
the plaintiffs and the defendants, with settlement pressure being the 
outcome.
46
  
To be sure, as long as they can sell insurance profitably
47
 and can raise 
rates after paying out, insurers need not assess the true cost of the 
litigation or the appropriate settlement amount. Individuals do not, 
however, pay increases in rates. The entity, which deducts them as a 
business expense, does.
48
 The result is further aggravation of the agency 
 
 
 40. See The Missing Monitor, supra note 38, at 1820; Tom Baker & Sean J. Griffith, Predicting 
Corporate Governance Risk: Evidence from the Directors‟ & Officers‟ Liability Insurance Market, 74 
U. CHI. L. REV. 487, 527 (noting that although in the immediate post-Enron period insurers pressed on 
governance issues, the emphasis was likely to fade as the market shifted) [hereinafter Predicting 
Corporate Governance Risk]. 
 41. See How the Merits Matter, supra note 35, at 818–19 (describing insurers‘ financial incentive 
largely as return on the policy, which flow from investing premia for a sufficient amount of time 
before paying out on the policy). 
 42. The Missing Monitor, supra note 38, at 1820. 
 43. Id. Indeed, one of the recommendations in this Article is for disclosure of defense counsel 
fees—both to provide transparency and information as well as to provide a check on plaintiffs‘ 
attorneys‘ fees. See infra at Part IV.  
 44. How the Merits Matter, supra note 35, at 801; see also James D. Cox, Private Litigation and 
the Deterrence of Corporate Misconduct, 60 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 1, 29–36 (1997) (discussing 
market for insurance). 
 45. How the Merits Matter, supra note 35, at 799 (describing bad-faith actions against insurers).  
 46. Id. at 806–07 (describing how defense counsel make insurers into ―bad guys‖ to pressure 
plaintiffs to settle); id. at 809–13 (describing how layers of insurance complicate collusion); see also 
Gusinsky v. Bailey, No. 603126/06, 2008 WL 4490008, at *3 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Sept. 17, 2008) (rejecting 
attorneys‘ fees in settlement of case where only ―results‖ were ―minor changes in corporate 
governance‖ but insurers were willing to pay attorneys‘ fees). 
 47. The Missing Monitor, supra note 38, at 1842. 
 48. Id. at 1826. 
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problems. Thus, in the aggregate-litigation context, the defendants‘ agency 
gap is at least as problematic as the plaintiffs‘.49  
Settlements are, of course, an important mechanism for resolving 
disputes without admissions of wrongdoing. They remove cases from the 
system and help to alleviate pressure on crowded dockets.
50
 Importantly, 
they prevent trials and the significant time and costs associated with those. 
Thus, they have their place and their value in the dispute resolution 
process.  
Settlements also, however, present general, ―non-agency‖ costs as well. 
Avoiding trials has costs. First, the entities, not the individuals, usually 
pay corporate and securities settlements. The result is a reallocation of 
resources and funds from today‘s shareholders to yesterday‘s. This 
financial shift occurs directly when the entity pays to settle the case or 
indirectly when the insurers pay. Either way, the current shareholders lose. 
Second, because insurance covers both the litigation costs and the 
settlements of most securities and corporate settlements, the company and 
the individuals do not face the actual cost of any wrongdoing or the 
settlement. Indemnification and insurance make the financial impact of the 
litigation indirect. The company pays for the insurance before the claims 
occur. Any adjustment in insurance rates happens later in time, potentially 
with officers and directors in place. Further, insurance is a deductible 
corporate expense, making its bottom-line impact even more diffuse.  
As a result, insurance and entity—rather than individual—payments 
diminish the incentive of any agency cost monitoring on the defendants‘ 
side. Indeed, taken together, these factors sever the financial reality of 
claims and cases from the outcomes and settlements. The result is further 
erosion of any deterrence effect, potential or actual, of the claims.
51
  
Third, if the case is a strong one, the settlement can deprive plaintiffs 
of a more robust remedy, such as larger payments or damages at trial. The 
settlement may also deny shareholders in a particular company, and at 
large, of the incentive effects provided by personal payments from 
 
 
 49. See Predicting Corporate Governance Risk, supra note 40, at 543 (arguing that insurance 
coverage does not help to align manager and shareholder interests). 
 50. Settlements also have other downsides not explored here. See Janet Cooper Alexander, Do 
the Merits Matter? A Study of Settlements in Securities Class Actions, 43 STAN. L. REV. 497, 567 
(1991) (arguing that as more and more securities cases settle, predictions of trial outcomes becomes 
increasingly difficult); see also Marc Galanter & Mia Cahill, “Most Cases Settle”: Judicial Promotion 
and Regulation of Settlements, 46 STAN. L. REV. 1339, 1384 (1994) (arguing that ―where most cases 
settle, legal signals may lose clarity‖). 
 51. See How the Merits Matter, supra note 35, at 762 (noting that insurance ―subverts‖ 
deterrence value of cases). 
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insiders. Individual payments avoid the pocket-shifting problems 
described above, and they can act as deterrents.  
Fourth, settlements prevent substantive law from evolving.
52
 They 
often occur before trial and even before significant discovery. Thus, 
settlements prevent the development of facts and factual findings and 
diminish and inhibit the development of legal doctrine.
53
 In essence, they 
cap the growth of the law. The result is a stunted understanding of the 
actual duties and the roles of directors and officers. 
Aggregate litigation and its agency costs magnify these negative 
settlement effects. The plaintiffs are removed from the case, represented 
by counsel and representative plaintiffs. As a result, they are not engaged 
in monitoring the case. Insurance and indemnification serve to prevent 
out-of-pocket payments by defendants and, consequently, diminish the 
incentive of defendants to monitor the cases as well. The result is 
collusion. Monitoring for that collusion is the judge‘s role. 
III. JUDGES AS GATEKEEPERS 
As developed in Part II, the settlement process aggrandizes the agency 
costs present in aggregate litigation. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 
and existing common law seek to counteract these agency costs at 
settlement by assigning fiduciary-like responsibilities to judges. Indeed, 
the cases explicitly describe judges as the fiduciary for these cases and 
task them with being merits reviewers, or monitors and enablers.
54
 These 
responsibilities existed under the old version of Rule 23(e)
55
 and the then-
existing case law,
56
 and are present under the new version of 23(e) as 
 
 
 52. Settlements account for a very large percentage of cases in court resolved before trial. See, 
e.g., BRUCH L. HAY & KATHRYN E. SPIER, THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS AND 
THE LAW, P-2, at 442 (Peter Newman ed., 1998) (reporting that approximately 90 percent of cases filed 
settle before trial); Judith Resnick, Trial as Error, Jurisdiction as Injury: Transforming the Meaning of 
Article III, 113 HARV. L. REV. 924, 928 (2000) (stating that 60–70 percent of cases settle before going 
to trial). 
 53. See Leandra Lederman, Precedent Lost: Why Encourage Settlement, and Why Permit Non-
Party Involvement in Settlements?, 75 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 221 (1999); Hillary A. Sale, Heightened 
Pleading and Discovery Stays: An Analysis of the Effect of the PSLRA‟s Internal-Information Standard 
on „33 and „34 Act Claims, 76 WASH. U. L.Q. 537 (1998); see also Owen M. Fiss, Against Settlement, 
93 YALE L.J. 1073 (1984); Lawrence B. Solum, Procedural Justice, 78 S. CAL. L. REV. 181 (2004). 
 54. See infra notes 55–63 and accompanying text. 
 55. Prior to December 1, 2003, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(e) stated: 
Dismissal or Compromise. A class action shall not be dismissed or compromised without the 
approval of the court, and notice of the proposed dismissal or compromise shall be given to 
all members of the class in such manner as the court directs. 
 56. See Joel A. v. Giuliani, 218 F.3d 132, 138 (2d Cir. 2000) (noting that before approving a 
settlement under Rule 23(e), ―the district court must determine that a class action settlement is fair, 
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well.
57
 It is through this role that judges become gatekeepers. Without their 
approval, cases cannot settle. 
Unlike individual private cases, like a contract dispute, aggregate and 
derivative parties cannot simply settle the case and dismiss their claims.
58
 
Instead, the judges must evaluate the settlement proposals and approve 
them. The purpose is to protect the absentee class members and minimize 
agency costs. In essence, the judges are tasked with filling the gaps the 
litigation mechanism creates. Judges must monitor the litigation and 
review and approve settlements. Their job is to adjust for and counteract 
the agency problems and litigation gaps.
59
 It is through this process that 
the judges become settlement gatekeepers. 
The language of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(e) and Delaware‘s 
equivalent both assign this fiduciary-like role to judges.
60
 This Article 
constructs it as a gatekeeping role because of the specific monitoring and 
enabling functions the judges must perform. Their job is to protect the 
class members.
61
 Before approving a binding settlement under 23(e)(2), 
 
 
adequate, and reasonable, and not a product of collusion‖); Grunin v. Int‘l House of Pancakes, 513 
F.2d 114, 123 (8th Cir. 1975) (citations omitted) (―Under Rule 23(e) the district court acts as a 
fiduciary who must serve as a guardian of the rights of absent class members. The court cannot accept 
a settlement that the proponents have not shown to be fair, reasonable, and adequate.‖). 
 57. As amended effective December 1, 2009, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(e) states: 
The claims, issues, or defenses of a certified class may be settled, voluntarily dismissed, or 
compromised only with the court‘s approval. The following procedures apply to a proposed 
settlement, voluntary dismissal, or compromise: 
(1) The court must direct notice in a reasonable manner to all class members who would be 
bound by the proposal. 
(2) If the proposal would bind class members, the court may approve it only after a hearing 
and on finding that it is fair, reasonable, and adequate. 
(3) The parties seeking approval must file a statement identifying any agreement made in 
connection with the proposal. 
(4) If the class action was previously certified under Rule 23(b)(3), the court may refuse to 
approve a settlement unless it affords a new opportunity to request exclusion to individual 
class members who had an earlier opportunity to request exclusion but did not do so. 
(5) Any class member may object to the proposal if it requires court approval under this 
subdivision (e); the objection may be withdrawn only with the court‘s approval. 
FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e). 
 58. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e) (requiring court approval of proposed settlements); DEL. SUPER. 
CT. R. CIV. P. 23(e) (same). 
 59. See Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Judicial Review of Class Action Settlements, 
(NYU Law and Economics Research Paper No. 07-34, 2007), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract= 
1017266 (noting that judicial review is the ―most important safeguard‖ over class counsel agency 
costs). 
 60. See Chris Brummer, Note, Sharpening the Sword: Class Certification, Appellate Review, and 
the Role of the Fiduciary Judge in Class Action Lawsuits, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 1042, 1042 (2004) 
(stating that in class actions the judge should act as a fiduciary to the absent class members).  
 61. Id. (urging that in accordance with his fiduciary role, a judge may be required to ―pierce the 
surface‖ of the complaint to protect class members). 
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for example, judges must determine that the proposal is ―fair, reasonable, 
and adequate.‖62 This is a unique role tied to the agency concerns. Judges 
have the power and the responsibility to guard against the agency issues 
and protect the interests of the shareholders and class members.
63
 No 
approval, no settlement. Consider the three cases below. I use them to 
construct the role of gatekeeping judges.  
In re Caremark International Inc. Derivative Litigation.
64
 In this case, 
Chancellor Allen exhibits a limited example of settlement gatekeeping. 
The Caremark plaintiffs alleged a breach of fiduciary duty: the board 
failed to monitor and oversee compliance with health care regulations.
65
 
The main issue was whether the board had paid sufficient attention to 
possible ―kickback‖ payments to physicians in exchange for referrals to 
Caremark facilities for treatment.
66
 Caremark had guidelines and policies 
preventing quid pro quo payments but allowing for consulting and 
research contracts with doctors who recommended or prescribed Caremark 
services and products.
67
 The Health and Human Services Office of the 
Inspector General investigated Caremark for violations, joined by the 
Department of Justice and several other federal and state agencies and, 
later, indicted the company and several officers.
68
  
Caremark settled various federal and state matters pending against it.
69
 
Not only were no senior officers or directors cited for wrongdoing, but the 
Department of Justice also stipulated that no ―senior executive of 
Caremark participated in, condoned, or was willfully ignorant of 
wrongdoing in connection with the home infusion business practices.‖70 
The entity itself, however, paid significant criminal and civil fines.
71
 It 
 
 
 62. FED R. CIV. P. 23(e). 
 63. See, e.g., James D. Cox, Making Securities Fraud Class Actions Virtuous, 39 ARIZ. L. REV. 
497, 524 (1997) (urging judges to review settlements more actively); Judith Resnik, Money Matters: 
Judicial Market Interventions Creating Subsidies and Awarding Fees and Costs in Individual and 
Aggregate Litigation, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 2119, 2175–77 (2000) (pressing for increased judicial 
intervention in settlements and fee petitions).  
 64. 698 A.2d 959 (Del. Ch. 1996). 
 65. Id. at 961–62. 
 66. Id. 
 67. Id. at 962. 
 68. Id. at 962–63. In fact, when initiated, the investigation was of Caremark‘s corporate 
predecessor. Id. 
 69. Id. at 964. 
 70. Id. at 965. 
 71. Id. at 965 n.10. 
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also formally agreed to make some internal changes that would enhance 
compliance.
72
 Civil litigation and a settlement proposal followed.
73
  
When Chancellor Allen reviewed the settlement proposal, he found that 
the board actually had been involved in overseeing its physician 
relationships, had consulted with legal advisors, and had adopted policies 
and programs to train employees about the various laws and regulations. 
The proposed settlement was non-monetary and contained only one 
significant aspect: the formation of a Compliance and Ethics Committee to 
report to the board on monitoring and compliance systems.
74
 The 
Chancellor noted that Caremark‘s liability was significant and criminal, 
but he questioned the board‘s ability to prevent the problems—beyond the 
monitoring in which it had engaged. Thus, he found the plaintiffs‘ breach 
of fiduciary duty claims were ―extremely weak.‖75 Then, although he 
approved the settlement—finding that the plaintiffs‘ attorneys had 
―gotten‖ something—he termed the benefits of the proposed settlement 
―modest.‖76 This finding lays the groundwork for the Chancellor‘s 
gatekeeping act. 
Chancellor Allen next evaluated the plaintiffs‘ attorneys‘ fees. He 
applied the following factors:  
 The financial value of the benefit that the lawyers [sic] work 
produced; the strength of the claims (because substantial settlement 
value may sometimes be produced even though the litigation added 
little value—i.e., perhaps any lawyer could have settled this claim 
for this substantial value or more); the amount of complexity of the 
legal services; the fee customarily charged for such services; and 
the contingent nature of the undertaking.
77
  
He determined that the only factor ―point[ing] to a substantial fee, [was 
the] . . . amount and sophistication of the lawyer services required.‖78 He 
found that the requested fee exceeded the value of the services provided. 
The Chancellor therefore reduced the fee by about 20 percent, which 
reflected actual attorney hours with a premium for the limited 
contingency.
79
 
 
 
 72. Id. at 965. 
 73. Id. at 964. 
 74. Id. at 966. 
 75. Id. at 972. 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. (emphasis in original). 
 78. Id.  
 79. Id. Of course, the settlement had considerable other value, such as revamping the corporate 
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Reducing the attorneys‘ fees in this manner is a simple form of 
gatekeeping.
80
 When the Chancellor adjusted the fees, he made clear that 
the defendants had ―given away‖ too much. Indeed, although the opinions 
and literature appear to assume that the defendants are monitoring their 
attorneys, this Article points out both that defendants lack an incentive to 
do so and that, as a result, in order to fulfill their gatekeeping role, the 
courts cannot monitor only plaintiffs‘ counsel.81 As the Caremark 
proposed settlement makes clear, rational defendants may have viewed the 
settlement as being for nuisance value. The court‘s opinion and the 
decrease in attorney‘s fees, however, makes clear that the actual nuisance 
value was less than what the defendants willingly accepted.  
Reynolds v. Beneficial National Bank.
82
 The Reynolds opinion also 
helps lay the groundwork for the construct of gatekeeping judges. In 
Reynolds, Judge Posner applied Rule 23(e) to a district court-approved 
settlement, stating that the district court needed to ―determine that a class 
action settlement [wa]s fair, adequate, and reasonable, and not a product of 
collusion.‖83 The court held that the key issue was whether the ―district 
judge discharged the judicial duty to protect the members of a class in 
class action litigation from lawyers for the class who may, in derogation of 
their professional and fiduciary obligations, place their pecuniary self-
interest ahead of that of the class.‖84 As the discussion below points out, 
this gatekeeping statement fails to examine fully the defendants‘ role in 
the collusion. True gatekeeping requires better scrutiny of both sides.  
The Seventh Circuit applied the abuse-of-discretion standard to 
conclude that the district court failed to analyze the settlement details, and 
then reversed and remanded for review. The court held that the district 
judge failed to provide a record to support its finding that the settlement 
 
 
duty to monitor. This result, however, seems properly attributed to Chancellor Allen, and not to the 
plantiffs‘ lawyers. 
 80. See also Helaba Invest Kapitalanlagegesellschaft mbH v. Fialkow, No. 2683-VCL, 2008 WL 
1128721, at *5 (Del. Ch. Apr. 11, 2008) (finding that fees of $500,000 rather than the $1.5 million 
requested were appropriate compensation for plaintiffs‘ counsel where benefit to class resulted from 
various factors and not just the role of plaintiffs‘ counsel); In re Ramp Corp. Sec. Litig., No. 05 Civ. 
6521, 2008 WL 58938, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 3, 2008) (awarding plaintiffs‘ counsel $310,000 in fees 
instead of $520,000 requested). 
 81. See Goldberger v. Integ. Res., Inc., 209 F.3d 43, 44–45 (2d Cir. 2000) (finding that district 
court did not abuse discretion in awarding fees substantially below those requested); Gunter v. 
Ridgewood Energy Corp., 223 F.3d 190, 197–200 (3d Cir. 2000) (setting out new standards for class-
action fee award practices). 
 82. 288 F.3d 277 (7th Cir. 2002). 
 83. Id. at 279. 
 84. Id.  
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met Rule 23(e)‘s strictures.85 At the time the lower court approved the 
settlement most of the then-filed cases had ―failed.‖86 A couple had 
survived pre-trial motions, and one was scheduled for trial.
87
 
According to the complaints, H&R Block (―Block‖) and Beneficial 
National Bank violated consumer-finance laws and breached fiduciary 
duties in the context of tax refund anticipation loans.
88
 Block offered loans 
to customers for the time period between filing a tax claim and their 
refund.
89
 The annual interest rate on the loans exceeded 100 percent.
90
 
Block arranged the loans, but Beneficial provided the money and paid 
Block.
91
 Block clients were not told of Beneficial‘s role or that Block 
owned part of the loans.
92
 Thus, the arrangements created the impression 
that Block was a fiduciary when it was, in fact, engaged in self-dealing.  
Consider the settlement and the circumstances surrounding it. Three 
plaintiffs‘ lawyers, none of whom had cases pending, had lunch with a key 
defense lawyer for Beneficial.
93
 Beneficial‘s lawyer proposed a ―global 
settlement‖94 of approximately $23 to $25 million.95 The plaintiffs‘ 
lawyers then filed a class-action complaint against Beneficial and Block.
96
 
The plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed Block, but when settlement 
negotiations officially ensued, Beneficial, which had agreed to indemnify 
Block, insisted Block be included.
97
  
This settlement negotiation is collusive. Defense counsel wanted a 
settlement and was actively pursuing it. The result was a settlement 
agreement that, among other things, required the filing of a new complaint 
with the Block entities as defendants.
98
 Beneficial and Block agreed to 
split a payment of $25 million, with a $15 million cap for any individual 
plaintiff, to disclose refund-anticipation loan details in the future, to pay 
the costs of notice to the class members, and to pay the plaintiffs‘
 
 
 85. Id. at 286. 
 86. Id. at 280. 
 87. Id. 
 88. Id. 
 89. Id.  
 90. Id. 
 91. Id. 
 92. Id.  
 93. Id. 
 94. Id. at 280. 
 95. Id. at 281. 
 96. Id. 
 97. Id. 
 98. Id. 
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attorneys‘ fees separately from the settlement.99 They also agreed that any 
uncollected funds would revert to the defendants.
100
  
The district court approved the settlement, rejecting the reversion 
clause. It also insisted on an increase in the individual cap to $30 million 
because a majority of class members had received two refund-anticipation 
loans.
101
 According to the Seventh Circuit, the district judge found the 
settlement amount adequate, but relied on unsworn testimony from an 
accountant without questioning the methodology.
102
 In fact, after class 
notices went out to seventeen million people, one million filed claims, 
completely exhausting the fund.
103
  
Would-be plaintiffs objected to the settlement, calling it the result of a 
―reverse auction.‖104 They argued that the defense attorneys selected the 
most ―ineffectual‖ class lawyers to negotiate a weak settlement with 
preclusive effect—a valuable result.105 The Seventh Circuit criticized the 
district judge for failing to scrutinize the settlement circumstances.
106
 In 
fact, Block had substantial financial exposure in a pending Texas 
fiduciary-duty case with a disgorgement demand of all fees paid, up to $2 
billion dollars.
107
 In short, the defendants had a huge incentive to settle—
particularly in light of the district judge‘s willingness to enjoin the Texas 
case.
108
 Indeed, they were ―happy to pay generous attorneys‘ fees since all 
they care[d] about [was] the bottom line—the sum of the settlement and 
the attorneys‘ fees—and not the allocation of money between the two 
categories of expense.‖109  
 
 
 99. Id. As a result, the fees would not directly diminish the settlement amount. See id. at 282. 
 100. Id. at 281. 
 101. Id. at 282. 
 102. Id. 
 103. Id. 
 104. Id. For discussions of how defense attorneys have attempted to conduct informal auctions in 
aggregate litigation, see Jonathan T. Molot, An Old Judicial Role for a New Litigation Era, 113 YALE 
L.J. 27, 50–51 (2003); Class Wars, supra note 27, at 1347. These concerns are not generally present in 
securities litigation where court-appointed lead plaintiffs control the selection of counsel.  
 105. Reynolds, 288 F.3d at 282. 
 106. Id. at 283. 
 107. Id. 
 108. Id. Further, the total settlement amount paid was the same as what Beneficial alone had 
apparently indicated it was willing to pay two years earlier. Id. 
 109. Id. at 282. Note, however, that the statement that the defense attorneys do not care about 
more gives short shrift to their clients‘ concerns. To the extent that defendants are or are likely to be 
repeat class action players, they should care more about paying off the plaintiffs‘ attorneys and focus 
more on the portions of the settlements rather than the bottom line. Indeed, the defense attorneys 
arguably have a fiduciary interest in objecting even to nuisance settlements if their clients are likely to 
be repeat players. 
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This settlement presents a dramatic instance of an agency problem, 
with the defendants initiating the bad outcome. Unfortunately, on appeal, 
the Seventh Circuit failed to address that issue. It did, however, engage in 
some strong gatekeeping on other aspects of the settlement, including an 
injunction preventing notice to the Texas class members about the status 
of the litigation or whether to opt out of the settlement.
110
 It also chastised 
the lower court for requesting fee applications be submitted in camera, 
without any sound basis.
111
 Finally, the Seventh Circuit smacked the 
district court for failing to provide a record for appellate review of the 
allowed fees or the settlement itself.
112
 As a result, the Seventh Circuit 
concluded that the district court had abused its discretion and remanded 
the case to a different judge for a new Rule 23(e) review.
113
 
All of these actions are gatekeeping. They provide examples of 
monitoring the settlement before enabling it. In contrast with the fee-
adjustment in Caremark, this case shows a more forceful form of 
gatekeeping, rejection of the settlement with a remand to a different 
judge.
114
 In the gatekeeping process, the court verified the information 
before it and reviewed the merits, or lack thereof, of the proposal.  
This judicial due-diligence process, then, adds to the construct of 
judicial gatekeeping. Importantly, the court‘s rendition of the facts 
surrounding the collusive settlement process is extremely valuable. 
Counsel on both sides had an incentive not to reveal those circumstances 
and only the appeal, pressed by different plaintiffs‘ counsel, exposed it. 
Thus, the opinion provides evidence of the collusion that actually created 
the circumstances for the settlement in the first place. The gatekeeping 
outcome would be stronger, however, if the court had focused on the 
defense counsel‘s significant contributions to the collusive settlement. The 
next case study also reveals collusion. 
In re TD Banknorth Shareholders Litigation.
115
 Delaware delegates the 
role of enforcing director and officer fiduciary duties to private litigation. 
 
 
 110. Id. at 284. 
 111. Id. at 286. 
 112. Id. at 284. 
 113. Id. at 286. 
 114. Id. at 289. On remand, the new district judge rejected the settlement, found that the class 
plaintiffs and counsel had been inadequate representatives, and ordered that the settlement counsel 
would not continue to represent the class. 260 F. Supp. 2d 680, 694–95 (N.D. Ill. 2003). Proceeding 
with new counsel, the parties again attempted to reach a settlement, which was rejected by the district 
court. See Carnegie v. Household Int‘l, Inc., 445 F. Supp. 2d 1032, 1034 (N.D. Ill. 2006) (describing 
procedural history of the case). Finally, on the eve of trial, the parties reached a third settlement, which 
the district court approved. Id. 
 115. 938 A.2d 654 (Del. Ch. 2007). 
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To ensure enforcement, Delaware provides for fee shifting to successful 
attorneys.
116
 The system thus relies on private attorneys to take the lead, 
assuming that if they do so well, the fees they receive will provide them 
with sufficient incentive to continue doing so.  
In TD Banknorth, Vice Chancellor Lamb reviewed a proposed 
settlement arising out of claims surrounding a merger between Toronto-
Dominion Bank, which already held a majority interest in Banknorth, and 
TD Banknorth, Inc.
117
 To accomplish the merger, Toronto-Dominion 
acquired the remaining publicly traded shares of Banknorth.  
As is the norm, the proposed settlement released the defendants from 
any potential liability. In return, it provided three things to the plaintiff 
class. The first was $0.03 per share in monetary consideration, an increase 
of less than one-tenth of one percent in the merger price per share, payable 
to former minority shareholders and to the defendant shareholders.
118
 The 
second was an exclusion of only 11,596, out of over 96 million, shares 
from the vote requiring approval of the transaction by a majority of the 
minority.
119
 The third item comprised four additional disclosures to 
shareholders, including some that had actually occurred prior to the 
settlement agreement.
120
 In addition, the attorneys for the class submitted a 
request for $1,045,000 in costs and fees.
121
 There were formal objectors to 
the proposed settlement who argued the court should reject it because the 
plaintiffs had ―viable contractual and entire fairness claims‖ that they were 
exchanging for ―insubstantial consideration.‖122  
The Delaware standard of review for settlement proposals is very 
similar to the standard under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(e). The 
court must determine ―whether, in the exercise of its own business 
judgment and in light of the facts and circumstances presented, the 
proposed settlement is a fair and reasonable resolution‖ of the litigation.123 
The focus is on whether the outcome redresses any wrong done to the 
corporation (in a derivative case) or the shareholders (in a direct case). In 
addition, judicial gatekeepers must balance the then-existing facts and 
 
 
 116. See Tandycrafts, Inc. v. Initio Partners, 562 A.2d 1162, 1164–65 (Del. 1989) (describing the 
standards controlling when the court may award attorneys‘ fees to successful plaintiffs). 
 117. TD Banknorth, 938 A.2d at 656–57. 
 118. Id. at 657 n.1. 
 119. Id. at 657. 
 120. Id. 
 121. Id. 
 122. Id. 
 123. Id. 
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discovery with the reality of incomplete discovery and a case that is not 
trial-ready. 
The TD Banknorth court examined the factual record describing the 
parties and their claims. There were two corporate defendants, TD 
Banknorth and the Toronto-Dominion Bank. Key individual defendants 
included W. Edmund Clark, the president and CEO of Toronto-Dominion; 
William J. Ryan, the chair, president, and CEO of Banknorth (until he was 
replaced as president in September 2006 and as CEO in March 2007); and 
P. Kevin Condron, the chair of Banknorth‘s committee of independent 
directors [Special Committee].
124
 
The following facts are important to the gatekeeping. In March of 
2005, Toronto-Dominion acquired a 51 percent ownership interest in 
Banknorth for $42.23 per share.
125
 The banks executed a shareholders‘ 
agreement (the Agreement) to prevent Toronto-Dominion from acquiring 
more than 66.7 percent of Banknorth‘s publicly held stock, except in 
compliance with the Agreement. The purpose of the restriction was to 
prevent Toronto-Dominion from initiating a going-private transaction 
before March of 2007, unless the Special Committee invited it.
126
  
Yet, about nine months after the Agreement, six Toronto-Dominion 
representatives, including a Banknorth officer and director, attended a 
Banknorth Special Committee meeting.
127
 The Special Committee 
considered a going-private transaction and tasked its chair, Condron, to 
study ―how a process would work in the event that‖ it decided to invite 
Toronto-Dominion to purchase the minority shares.
128
 The Special 
Committee hired its own legal and financial advisors.
129
 Shortly thereafter, 
Ryan urged a going-private discussion at a Special Committee meeting
130
 
and at an executive session of the board. At the meeting, Clark stated that 
Toronto-Dominion ―might be interested in pursuing exploratory 
discussions if invited to do so by the [Special Committee].‖131  
These discussions continued for quite a few months before the 
Agreement period had ended, with Clark again indicating Toronto-
 
 
 124. Id. at 658. 
 125. Id. Following the 51 percent transaction, Toronto-Dominion continued to acquire Banknorth 
shares until it held approximately 59.5 percent. Id. at 659. 
 126. Id. at 658–59. 
 127. Id. at 659. 
 128. Id. 
 129. Id. Later that month or in early May, Private Capital Management, a 7.6 percent shareholder 
of Banknorth contacted Ryan and Clark, the president and CEO of Toronto-Dominion, about a 
privatizing transaction. Id. at 659–60. 
 130. Id. at 660. 
 131. Id. He also told the Special Committee about the Private Capital Management discussions.  
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Dominion‘s interest in a transaction ―if invited‖132 and keeping tabs on 
discussions and meetings.
133
 Negotiations occurred, with Condron 
rejecting Clark‘s offer and Clark refusing to offer more.134 Condron 
terminated the negotiations at the end of September 2006 ―in the best 
interests of Banknorth‘s minority stockholders.‖135 Shortly thereafter, 
however, negotiations resumed. In the interim, Banknorth had lowered its 
earnings estimates, causing the Special Committee‘s financial advisor to 
adjust the transaction price down. The result was a November proposal to 
―invite‖ Toronto-Dominion to offer $32.33.136 Both boards immediately 
approved the transaction.
137
 
Multiple class actions in Delaware, New York, and Maine followed. 
The key question was whether the discussions between conflicted 
Banknorth officers/directors and those of Toronto-Dominion violated the 
prohibition on discussions without an invitation. Although the Delaware 
plaintiffs served a document request, they agreed to an extension for an 
indefinite period.
138
 Banknorth filed its preliminary proxy statement and 
forms with the SEC ―documenting‖ the fairness report on which the 
Special Committee relied, and plaintiffs‘ counsel reviewed and analyzed 
them.
139
  
The Maine plaintiffs, however, moved for expedited discovery. The 
Maine judge set a hearing date, prompting the Delaware plaintiffs to file a 
consolidated complaint and issue a settlement proposal—despite the fact 
that they had not reviewed any documents other than the publicly filed 
SEC forms. The first offer was for corrective disclosures without any 
monetary demands.
140
 
The Maine plaintiffs continued to do discovery, prompting the 
Delaware plaintiffs to make a settlement demand of a $0.05 per share 
increase in the merger consideration. The parties agreed to $0.03. 
Banknorth also filed a revised proxy statement with additional 
disclosures.
141
 In April, the Banknorth shareholders approved the merger 
 
 
 132. Id. 
 133. Id. 
 134. Id. at 660–61. 
 135. Id. at 661. 
 136. Id. 
 137. Id. 
 138. Id. at 662. 
 139. Id.  
 140. Id. 
 141. Id.  
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with 95 percent of the minority shareholders voting in favor. Banknorth 
went private that month.
142
 
The Delaware plaintiffs‘ counsel attended the Maine depositions, 
dubbing them ―confirmatory‖ discovery and, presumably in hopes of a 
good settlement for all, the Maine plaintiffs then stipulated to a stay of 
their action. Objectors to the Delaware case filed a motion to intervene and 
to preliminarily enjoin the merger vote. But the Delaware parties entered 
into a stipulation of settlement, and the court denied the objectors‘ 
motions.
143
 The result of all of these maneuvers was a completed 
transaction, followed by objections to the proposed settlement.
144
  
Vice Chancellor Lamb examined both the facts and the proposed 
settlement to determine whether it was fair and reasonable to the class.
145
 
He was aided by the presence of objectors who made a case that the 
Delaware plaintiffs were releasing apparently strong breach of contract 
claims.
146
 Vice Chancellor Lamb considered the roles of the conflicted 
Banknorth representatives and those from Toronto-Dominion, as well as 
the plain meaning of terms like ―propose‖ and ―initiation‖ in the 
agreement, and rejected the argument that only a formal proposal would 
violate the agreement.
147
 Instead, the vice chancellor noted that the 
agreement may have been drafted to prevent exactly the fact pattern that 
occurred.
148
 Thus, he concluded that there was ―substantial evidence to 
support a claim that the merger agreement [was] the product of the 
defendants‘ violation of the stockholders‘ agreement.‖149 
Vice Chancellor Lamb then turned to the proposed settlement terms. 
This portion of the opinion spotlights his gatekeeping role. He focused on 
the timeframe allowed for negotiations under the Agreement, noting that it 
would have been considerably later than the date of the questioned 
 
 
 142. Id. at 663. 
 143. Id. at 662. 
 144. Id. at 663. 
 145. Id. at 657.  
 146. To reach this conclusion, the court had to address whether the breach of contract claims were 
direct or derivative in nature. It found that the harm was direct and thus that the claims had not been 
extinguished by the merger. Id. at 666. 
 147. Id. at 665. 
 148. Id. at 665–66 (noting that a waiting period would allow for full integration from the 
acquisitions Banknorth was planning to undertake after Toronto-Dominion became majority 
shareholder and would prevent a merger if there were a downturn in the banking market). He also 
noted that the merger proxy statement supported that interpretation, by stating that the Shareholder 
Agreement prevented it from initiating or engaging in a going-private transaction before March 1, 
2007, unless requested to do so by the Special Committee. Id. 
 149. Id. at 666. 
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transaction.
150
 Further, because the transaction was a freeze-out merger, in 
which all of the Banknorth shareholders were to ―disappear,‖ he found that 
it was subject to the entire fairness doctrine—requiring analysis of both 
fair dealing and fair price.
151
 The vice chancellor concluded that the timing 
of the merger and the prima facie violation of the agreement both 
supported a conclusion that the complaint had a strong ―unfair process 
claim.‖152  
Vice Chancellor Lamb was an engaged gatekeeper. Consider the 
following: 
A reasonable class representative in the plaintiffs‘ position certainly 
would have tried to extract substantial consideration for the 
settlement of these claims. That plainly did not happen here. 
Instead, the named plaintiffs and their counsel failed to pursue this 
claim and, as a result, agreed to settle the case for only meager 
consideration.
153
  
He also rejected other aspects of the proposed settlement. He examined in 
detail the proxy disclosures the plaintiffs asserted resulted from their 
settlement negotiations, finding that in fact most of the disclosures were 
actually ―in response to SEC comment letters.‖154 ―Disclosure-driven‖ 
settlements, the vice chancellor reasoned, require the plaintiffs to show 
that their achievement would assist stockholders in determining whether to 
support the transaction.
155
 The plaintiffs could not meet this burden, 
however, because the key disclosures did not result from their efforts but 
from those of the SEC, and others were restatements of previously public 
information.
156
 
Next, the vice chancellor rejected the settlement notice. He found that 
it omitted an exhibit detailing the disclosures, leaving the stockholders 
uninformed about a material basis for the settlement.
157
 He also pointed 
out that it failed to explain that the defendants were to share in the cash 
portion of the settlement, an ―unusual‖ provision.158 He stated that it was 
 
 
 150. Id. at 667.  
 151. Id.  
 152. Id. at 668. He also compared this claim to a prior and similar Delaware case, finding this one 
to be stronger. Id. at 667–68. 
 153. Id. at 668 (emphasis added). 
 154. Id. at 669. Moreover, he noted that the most substantive additional disclosures were ―directly 
attributable to the work of the SEC‘s staff.‖ Id. 
 155. Id. 
 156. Id. at 669–70.  
 157. Id. at 670. 
 158. Id. 
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an ―odd proposition‖ that those who allegedly violated their fiduciary 
duties would share in the remedy for that violation.
159
  
Finally, the vice chancellor exposed the defendants‘ collusion in the 
outcome. Despite indications that the defendants breached their fiduciary 
duties, the proposed settlement allowed for dismissal with payments to the 
plaintiffs‘ attorneys and no personal payments by the defendants. The 
defendants were conflicted, both as to the outcome, a potential finding of 
personal liability, and the payment source—insurance or their own money. 
This conflict increased the defendants‘ incentive to settle and exacerbated 
the agency-cost situation.  
These three case studies provide examples of gatekeeping judges in 
various settlement contexts. Settlement is an acute point for active 
gatekeeping. It is the last chance to examine and control for the agency 
costs of the litigation. From weighing the fees to weighing both the 
appropriateness of any settlement and that of the proposed one, judicial 
gatekeepers must monitor before enabling. Part IV of this Article further 
develops this gatekeeping construct and then creates a set of principles for 
the gatekeepers.  
IV. GATEKEEPING PRINCIPLES 
Judges are the designated neutral decision-makers for aggregate 
litigation generally and for settlements in particular. As Part III revealed, a 
judicial gatekeeper can reduce settlement agency costs and improve the 
outcomes for the parties and for the legal system. Indeed, as the case 
studies reveal, some judges at both the trial and appellate level are 
exercising gatekeeping powers. The remainder of this section develops a 
set of principles for gatekeeping judges to use in monitoring and enabling 
settlement proposals.  
Reject Settlements. Although judges cannot draft the settlement, they 
have indirect power to do essentially that—through settlement rejection. 
This power to reject is what Professor Reinier Kraakman described in his 
Article on financial gatekeepers as the power to ―withhold support.‖160 
Financial gatekeepers control wrongdoers and exercise control over 
incentives indirectly by refusing to grant approval for transactions.
161
 
 
 
 159. Id. at 670–71. The plaintiffs argued that the language of the settlement proposal did make this 
situation clear, but the court flatly rejected that argument. Id. 
 160. See Kraakman, Gatekeepers, supra note 5, at 100. 
 161. Id. 
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Judicial gatekeepers who reject settlements also exercise control and can, 
thereby, establish templates for better settlement terms and processes.
162
 
Like the underwriters and accountants who control market access, 
judges control access to aggregate litigation settlements. No approval, no 
settlement. Rule 23(e) provides judges with the option to reject 
settlements. This is real power. Deploying rejection, even rarely, will 
create pressure for parties to provide better records, both as to their claims 
and their settlement processes. Inspecting the record, both for its 
thoroughness and for its reasonableness, is a form of due diligence. 
Judicial gatekeepers should reject proposals lacking sufficient information 
upon submission, with time allowed for a revised proposal.  
Improve the Record. Before approving settlements, judges can use Rule 
23(e) to add rigor to the settlement approval process. They can ask more 
and deeper questions of the parties. They can request better briefings and 
demand more thorough records. When appropriate, judges can insist on 
sworn testimony. They can require the parties to present evidence on 
different levels of potential outcomes with probabilities for comparison.
163
 
Evidence, sworn testimony, and statements from both parties about case 
status would enable judges ―to translate [their] intuitions about the . . . 
case‖ and its value into a ―responsible evaluation of the reasonableness of 
the settlement.‖164  
To be sure, settlement hearings are not, and should not be, ―mini-trials 
on the merits, [but the courts] should explore the facts sufficiently to make 
intelligent determinations concerning adequacy and fairness.‖165 
Settlement ―findings and conclusions should not be based simply on the 
arguments and recommendations of counsel‖; rather ―[t]here must be some 
‗evidentiary foundation‘ in support of the proposed settlement.‖166 
 
 
 162. See Fundamental Principles, supra note 30 (citing In re Warner Commc‘ns Sec. Litig., 798 
F.2d 35, 37 (2d Cir. 1986) (stating that district court cannot dictate settlement terms). In appropriate 
cases, the court might require an independent damages expert with the costs shared by the parties. Of 
course, rejection may not be perfect, but it can result in improvements. Compare SEC v. Bank of Am., 
653 F. Supp. 2d 507, 509 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (discussing proposed consent decree recommending a $33 
million Bank of America/SEC settlement as concocted for absolution and ―neither fair, nor reasonable, 
nor adequate‖), with SEC v. Bank of Am., Nos. 04 Civ. 6829, 10 Civ. 0215, 2010 WL 624581, at *1, 
*5 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 22, 2010) (―reluctantly‖ approving $150 million settlement as ―considerably 
greater‖ but still ―very modest‖ and insufficiently ―punitive‖ with respect to individual wrongdoing). 
 163. Reynolds v. Beneficial Nat‘l Bank, 288 F.3d 277, 285 (7th Cir. 2002). 
 164. Id.  
 165. Plummer v. Chem. Bank, 668 F.2d 654, 659 (2d Cir. 1982). 
 166. Id. (internal quotations omitted); see also Lewis v. Hirsch, No. Civ. A. 12,532, 1994 WL 
263551, at *7 (Del. Ch. June 1, 1994) (emphasis added) (declining to approve settlement where 
plaintiffs did not provide evidence that they had investigated what appeared to be significant insider-
trading claims before reaching agreement).  
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Demanding information will provide judges with a basis for better 
judgments and for making the best use of their intuitions.
167
 The result will 
not be ―scientific‖ or precise, but it would be a significant improvement 
over current practices.
168
 An increased record would increase some 
litigation costs, but it would also help to decrease agency costs.
169
  
Thus, courts should look to the ―evidentiary‖ support for any 
settlement proposal. Better records are not only required, but would also 
press on the quality of discovery. Consider Lewis v. Hirsch, a Delaware 
derivative opinion in which the Chancery Court rejected the proposed 
settlement due to insufficient discovery effort.
170
 The allegations included 
waste and excessive compensation as well as insider-trading/fiduciary 
duty claims.
171
  
The Lewis court benefitted from objectors in a case pending 
elsewhere.
172
 The objectors argued that the named plaintiff, Lewis, failed 
to do an adequate investigation of insider-trading claims before agreeing 
on a settlement.
173
 They pointed to their own allegations detailing what the 
defendants knew when and in relation to their purchases.
174
 They also 
 
 
 167. Indeed, some studies have compared judges to laypeople and found that judges do better at 
setting aside biases and decision-making heuristics. See, e.g., Chris Guthrie et al., Inside the Judicial 
Mind, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 777, 816 (2001) (finding that judges, although still susceptible to various 
decision-making heuristics, were less susceptible to some than laypeople); Reid Hastie & W. Kip 
Viscusi, What Juries Can‟t Do Well: The Jury‟s Performance as a Risk Manager, 40 ARIZ. L. REV. 
901, 904–08 (1998) (finding similar results, although with a limited group of judges); cf. Andrew J. 
Wistrich et al., Can Judges Ignore Inadmissible Information? The Difficulty of Deliberately 
Disregarding, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 1251, 1323–24 (2005) (finding that although judges are not able to 
avoid all influence from relevant but inadmissible information, they are able to do so in some 
important circumstances). 
 168. Consider, for example, the case Miller v. U.S. Foodservice, Inc., 361 F. Supp. 2d 470 (D. 
Md. 2005). In this matter, the Maryland District Court addressed the former CEO, Miller‘s, lawsuit for 
compensation he argued was due under his agreement with the company. Id. at 472. The company 
counterclaimed, arguing that Miller had breached fiduciary duties and obligations and that, therefore, 
the company was not obligated to pay out on the severance and might even be entitled to rescission. Id. 
The court agreed—at least at the motion to dismiss stage. Id. at 485. This case, although connected to a 
massive fraud settlement and later criminal matters, reveals serious concerns that, if not being 
addressed thoroughly by the company‘s board, should not be settled. Here, of course, the court 
respected that and denied the motion to dismiss. The same issues are relevant at the settlement stage.  
 169. Molot, supra note 104, at 113. But see Lisa L. Casey, Reforming Securities Class Actions 
from the Bench: Judging Fiduciaries and Fiduciary Judging, 2003 BYU L. REV. 1239, 1281–86 
(2003) (arguing that judges are not well-suited to this task). 
 170. 1994 WL 263551. 
 171. Id. at *1. 
 172. Objectors come in many flavors. See, e.g., New Eng. Health Care Emps. Pension Fund v. 
Woodruff, 520 F.3d 1255 (10th Cir. 2008) (objectors were defendants excluded from proposed 
settlement). On the role and value of objectors more generally, see Edward Brunet, Class Actions 
Objectors: Extortionist Free Riders or Fairness Guarantors, 2003 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 403 (2003). 
 173. Lewis, 1994 WL 263551, at *5. 
 174. Id. 
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argued that Lewis had not deposed the defendant president/chief executive 
officer of the company, despite the apparent receipt of over $78 million 
through the exercise of stock options.
175
  
Thus, the objectors did what the settlement did not: provide the court 
with a record and an evidentiary foundation to support their argument 
against settlement. The court exercised due diligence, examining the 
objectors‘ complaints and finding they had merit. It then rejected the 
settlement, finding that the failure to depose defendants and to provide 
information about documents related to the allegations doomed the 
settlement.
176
  
Although courts apply various factors at this stage of their analysis, 
they all focus on the likelihood of the plaintiffs‘ success and the value of 
the benefits of the settlement to the corporation and the shareholders.
177
 To 
do so, the court must examine the record and assure that it is adequate to 
allow the court to fulfill its gatekeeping role: determining whether the 
settlement amount is appropriate in relation to the claims.
178
 When the 
record is insufficient, as in Lewis, settlement rejection, pending better 
discovery, is appropriate.  
Account for the Role of Insurance. Insurance creates unique concerns 
in securities and corporate settlements. The case studies in this Article and 
the research on insurers reveal some of the reasons why these problems 
occur. Defendants rarely pay out of pocket to settle cases, decreasing their 
personal incentive to monitor.
179
 Defense attorneys‘ fees and settlements 
are usually paid out of insurance,
180
 which is indirectly paid for by 
shareholders.
181
 The result should be insurers as defense-side monitors. 
Yet, as analyzed above, they do not fulfill this role. Judicial gatekeepers 
can correct for this problem by insisting on a record sufficient to ensure 
that collusion is not occurring.  
 
 
 175. Id. at *5–6. The court also noted other criticism of deposition testimony and insufficient 
document requests that would have bolstered the insider-trading claims. Id. at *6. 
 176. Id. at *7. 
 177. Id. at *2. 
 178. Id.  
 179. See Black et al., supra note 37, at 1068 (noting the few instances directors have made out-of-
pocket contributions to settlements). 
 180. See Predicting Corporate Governance Risk, supra note 40. 
 181. See Donald C. Langevoort, On Leaving Corporate Executives “Naked, Homeless and 
Without Wheels”: Corporate Fraud, Equitable Remedies, and the Debate over Entity Versus 
Individual Liability, 42 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 627, 654–60 (2007) [hereinafter On Leaving Corporate 
Executives] (arguing that enterprise liability is ineffective in meeting either principles of compensation 
or deterrence goals, but that executive liability, if appropriately structured, might achieve deterrence). 
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To date, the focus on agency costs has been on the plaintiffs‘ side of 
these cases. Defendants‘ motives are equally mixed and are complicated 
by insurance. In order to fulfill their gatekeeping role, judges must combat 
the agency costs on both sides. To begin with, courts should insist on 
disclosure of, and transparency in, payment information and the source of 
settlement funds and fees. Collusion and fiduciary issues arise when 
insurers are paying the costs. Insisting that settlement proposals provide 
complete and transparent information about the insurance policy and 
payments would allow potential objectors and all shareholders to 
understand fully the choices the company and individuals made in 
agreeing to the settlement. It would also allow the gatekeeper to assess 
those incentives.  
Better gatekeeping would also help level the playing field between the 
insurers, the parties, and the courts. Currently, a handful of insurers 
dominate the corporate insurance market. The result is an informational 
asymmetry. The insurers have information about case values and 
settlements across jurisdictions. Defendants and the courts have very little. 
By demanding more information in settlement proposals, gatekeeping 
judges will educate themselves about whether and when settlements are 
appropriate. 
Question the Source of Payments. Before approving settlements, judges 
should be vigilant about whether it appears that wrongdoing actually 
occurred. If officers or directors ―wronged‖ the company, the company 
should be pursuing them, not protecting them. Judges should evaluate 
whether and when the allegations and discovery at settlement support the 
possibility of individual wrongdoing. Judges should consider postponing 
settlement approval until they receive better information. Questions 
include whether the parties ever discussed personal payments,
182
 whether 
any such payments are scaled to the level of wrongdoing,
183
 and whether 
the officers, and perhaps the directors, should pay back any money 
received as a result of the wrongdoing.
184
  
 
 
 182. See In re Caremark Int‘l Deriv. Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 965 n.13 (Del. Ch. 1996) (noting that 
such remedy was considered and rejected by the parties).  
 183. See SEC v. Bank of Am., 2010 WL 624581 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 22, 2010) (stating that even 
negligent wrongdoing can be a basis for personal payments). 
 184. See, e.g., SEC v. Yuen, 272 Fed. App‘x 615, 618 (9th Cir. 2008) (affirming lower court order 
requiring CEO, who was found liable for securities fraud, to disgorge compensation and pay 
penalties); see also Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 304(a), 15 U.S.C. § 7243(a) (Supp. 2002) (requiring 
that CEO and CFO reimburse issuer for certain compensation in periods where misconduct tied to 
material accounting restatements occur). 
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When the insurer pays, it is an indirect company/shareholder payment. 
If wrongdoing occurred, such payments wrong the plaintiffs twice. First, 
current shareholders pay for wrongs to prior shareholders. Second, 
corporate settlement payments by companies can decrease the value of the 
shareholders‘ stock. When that occurs, shareholders at the time of the 
alleged harm who own stock at the time of the settlement suffer a second 
injury. Yet, if the payments come from individuals, the same shareholder 
actually gains.
185
 Thus, the source of payments can be of economic 
significance to the plaintiffs.
186
  
Certain types of settlements can be signals for the possibility of 
individual wrongdoing, and courts should watch for them. For example, 
some insurers agree to drop coverage defenses in exchange for corporate 
contributions. The result is a settlement composed of funds within the 
insurance policy limits and company funds.
187
 In those situations, 
however, an additional layer of collusion may be occurring—here between 
the insurer, who wants to avoid coverage litigation, and the defendants, 
who do not want wrongdoing exposed. For the gatekeeping judge, such a 
settlement should provoke scrutiny. It should also provoke a demand for 
more discovery and individual contributions rather than corporate ones—
improving deterrence and helping to counteract the corporate and 
insurance agency gaps.
188
 Of course, if courts begin to push in this 
direction, the conflicts for defendants will increase and their desire to 
settle will as well.
189
 Courts, then, must pay attention to the effects of 
increased scrutiny and the fact that aggregate litigation can aggravate these 
problems. 
 
 
 185. Id. 
 186. See In re Warner Commc‘ns Sec. Litig., 798 F.2d 35, 38 (2d Cir. 1986) (Newman, J., 
concurring); cf. SEC v. Shah, 1993 WL 288285 (S.D.N.Y. July 28, 1993) (rejecting claim by former 
company officer that personal payments made to settle private securities litigation claims could be 
used as offset for disgorgement of profits in SEC matter).  
 187. See How the Merits Matter, supra note 35, at 822 (arguing that within-limits settlements 
combined with corporate contributions may be red flags for the presence of wrongdoing). 
 188. See Langevoort, supra note 181; see id. at 635 (―The problem is that executives themselves 
will not be deterred from misconduct when their personal gain from perpetrating or concealing the 
fraud exceeds the impact they would suffer should the corporation have to pay.‖); Black et al., supra 
note 37, at 1070 (noting that Enron and Worldcom directors paid $13 million and $24.75 million, 
respectively, in settling securities fraud cases).  
 189. Corporate officers should be the main focus of scrutiny. They are the day-to-day corporate-
governance watchers. Their access to information and fiduciary responsibilities exceed those of their 
director counterparts. Even so, personal payments need not be excessive, but should be calibrated to 
ensure forfeiture of any gains from the wrongdoing. See HealthSouth Corp. S‘holders Litig., 845 A.2d 
1096, 1105–06 (Del. Ch. 2003) (finding disgorgement appropriate where CEO was unjustly enriched 
in transaction with his company); see also On Leaving Corporate Executives, supra note 181, at 643–
44 (suggesting that executives forfeit wealth obtained through wrongdoing).  
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Scrutinize Substantive Settlements. Judicial gatekeepers should also 
regard settlements that are substantive, and not financial, with appropriate 
skepticism. Substantive settlements, or those which involve little in the 
way of financial payments other than attorneys‘ fees, can result in little 
gain, immediate or otherwise, to the plaintiffs.
190
 As in Caremark, where 
the remedy was a board committee, or in TD Banknorth, where the 
proposed remedy was additional disclosures, judges should attempt to 
assess the real value of the relief. If it does little other than restate the 
defendants‘ preexisting obligations, it should be rejected. When 
substantive relief offers little benefit to the plaintiffs, the defendants have 
offered little. Judicial gatekeepers should question why the case is settling, 
be chary of approving fees, and push to find out more. Importantly, the 
opposite is also true. When the settlement is substantive and produces 
value, the attorneys have done their job well and should be paid.
191
  
Award Appropriate Fees. Finally, judges should award fees for cases 
with returns to shareholders, whether in the form of greater deterrence or 
financial and other remedies. Empirical evidence reveals that judges 
exercise far less discretion than they can when it comes to fee setting.
192
 
Yet fees are a key part of the private-attorneys-general mechanism. The 
fees are the incentive for bringing the case. Good plaintiffs‘ lawyers 
discover fraud and wrongdoing and, by pursuing it, enforce the underlying 
laws and duties. They also assume the risk that they will ―receive no fee 
(or at least not the fee that reflects their efforts) when representing a class 
because their fee is linked to the success of the suit.‖193 Counsel should be 
well compensated when their work supports it.
194
 When it works, the 
 
 
 190. See, e.g., Gusinsky v. Bailey, 2008 WL 4490008, at *3 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Sept. 17, 2008), rev‟d 
with respect to attorneys‘ fees, 887 N.Y.S.2d 585 (N.Y. App. Div. 2009) (approving settlement but 
rejecting attorneys‘ fees where plaintiffs were to receive ―minor changes in corporate governances‖). 
 191. See Chan v. Diamond, No. 03 Civ. 8494(WHP), 2005 WL 941477, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 25, 
2005) (finding that plaintiffs had achieved actual results that provided for improved governance and 
approving fee request). 
 192. See Brian T. Fitzpatrick, An Empirical Study of Class Action Settlements and Their Fee 
Awards 28–33 (July 7, 2010), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1442108. Although it is a case 
involving the SEC, not private plaintiffs, Judge Rakoff‘s push for SEC control of certain board 
consultants pursuant to a consent decree is an example of a judge positively impacting the substantive 
portion of a settlement. See SEC v. Bank of Am., 2010 WL 624581 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 22, 2010) (stating 
that judge had pressed on language that SEC control choices, rather than agree with defendant). 
 193. Sutton v. Bernard, 504 F.3d 688, 694 (7th Cir. 2007) (remanding for revision district court 
opinion rejecting and lowering plaintiffs‘ counsels‘ fee request). 
 194. See id. (noting that where district court calculation failed to account for risk of loss, counsel 
may have been undercompensated). 
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theory and the reality meet.
195
 Fee setting, then, should support the theory, 
when it is supported by reality. 
Importantly, as the remedies change, the factors relevant to fee setting 
must include variables beyond the settlement‘s cash value.196 Fees should 
be tied to the lawyers‘ real value to the plaintiffs and to deterrence more 
generally. Thus, in a case like Caremark, the real value of the derivative 
litigation was less than it otherwise would have been because the 
government cases actually wrought most of the changes at the company.
197
 
Decreasing fees in Caremark was appropriate, in part, because it saved 
costs for the plaintiffs relative to the value of the litigation. In other cases, 
the opposite may be true, and judges should consider whether increased 
fees are appropriate.  
In addition to the amount of fees, courts should evaluate the proposed 
timing of fee payments and ensure that lawyers have an appropriate 
incentive to monitor the settlement resolution. One option is to push for 
provisions that provide for lawyers to be paid only after the class is 
paid.
198
 This requirement would help to ensure active attorney 
involvement until the settlement provisions have been implemented and 
the plaintiffs have been located. Currently, little is known about this aspect 
of securities and corporate litigation. The payment step is, in effect, a 
black box, with scant information available about the claims 
administration process. Gatekeeping judges should demand disclosure 
about this aspect of the settlement. Agency gaps likely exist here as well, 
and tying fees to remedy completion, so to speak, would help to decrease 
those gaps. 
Judges should require the disclosure of defense counsel fees as well. 
The disclosure would function as a check on the reasonableness of 
plaintiffs‘ attorneys‘ fees. Indeed, in some cases combined defense fees 
might surprise. 
 
 
 195. See, e.g., In re Enron Corp. Sec., Deriv. & ―ERISA‖ Litig., 586 F. Supp. 2d 732, 789 (S.D. 
Tex. 2008) (awarding $688 million in fees to attorneys in Enron case, finding that ―in the face of 
extraordinary obstacles, the skills, expertise, commitment, and tenacity of Lead Counsel in this 
litigation cannot be overstated,‖ and ―[n]ot to be overlooked are the unparalleled results, $7.2 billion in 
settlement funds, which demonstrate counsel‘s clearly superlative litigating and negotiating skills‖). 
 196. See Sutton, 504 F.3d at 693 (noting that the ―degree of success‖ achieved for class is key to 
fee setting). 
 197. See supra notes 69–76 and accompanying text; see also Reynolds v. Beneficial Nat‘l Bank, 
288 F.3d 277, 286 (7th Cir. 2002) (stating that attorneys‘ fees should be connected to incremental 
change achieved by plaintiffs‘ lawyers and not simply to overall settlement size). 
 198. See Nagareda, supra note 8, at 645 (citing cases in which courts delayed fee awards pending 
claims administration); id. (suggesting that plaintiffs‘ counsel would do well to volunteer to delay fees 
as a vouching mechanism). 
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As the above analysis reveals, the range of gatekeeping principles is 
broad. Courts can reject settlements—a dramatic response. They can also 
improve scrutiny of the record, demanding better information about the 
alleged wrongdoing, the discovery preceding settlement, and the 
settlement process. They can also scrutinize fees and fee arrangements, 
ensuring that lawyers executing their jobs well are paid appropriately. 
Judicial gatekeepers have many options to counteract the agency problems 
inherent in aggregate litigation. To be sure, as this section also makes 
clear, the task is time consuming. It is, however, both required and key to 
decreasing agency costs and collusion and ensuring that the litigation 
functions as intended. Transparency, disclosure, and pressure will help to 
decrease actual collusion as well as the arguably perverse effects 
indemnification and insurance create. Indeed, over time the process will 
become less time consuming because lawyers will learn what is required 
and, therefore, execute it before asking the judge for settlement approval. 
Further, ―[a] high degree of precision cannot be expected in valuing 
litigation, especially regarding the estimation of the probability of 
particular outcomes.‖199 Indeed, by definition, settlements are designed to 
make tradeoffs, including information. These issues are particularly salient 
in corporate and securities litigation where the injuries are financial and 
subject to market models, assumptions, and estimation. Precision in 
damage estimates or even in the likely outcome on underlying claims is 
dubious. Indeed the high rate of settlements in these cases contributes to 
the inability to predict trial outcomes. Simply put, not enough cases 
proceed to trial to allow for robust predictions. Thus, the existence of 
settlements partially prevents the development of information relevant to 
settlement. 
Yet, even though complete accuracy is unlikely, it can be improved. 
Caremark, Reynolds, and TD Banknorth provide examples of courts 
subjecting settlement proposals to scrutiny. To be sure, the judges have an 
information-asymmetry problem: they have limited information about 
facts, discovery, and party discussions.
200
 Gatekeeping judges, however, 
have the power to demand more information and, thereby, improve the 
settlement process and outcomes.
201
  
 
 
 199. Reynolds, 288 F.3d at 285. 
 200. See Class Action Conflicts, supra note 27, at 808 (noting that courts have signed off on 
settlements without demanding information). 
 201. See The Plaintiffs‟ Attorney, supra note 14, at 105–10 (advocating that judges divide class 
settlements into three classes and apply different levels of scrutiny to each, depending on factors like 
collusion and fairness). 
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Of course, if judicial gatekeepers spend more time on settlements, they 
may increase the amount of time that cases spend on the docket.
202
 Busy 
judges will then face their own personal and professional conflicts with 
resisting and scrutinizing settlements.
203
 Aggregate litigation exacerbates 
this problem. Judges report that they spend more time on class actions than 
other civil litigation.
204
 This statistic is not surprising. Judges are assigned 
a different role in these cases. Rule 23(e) requires them to conduct an 
―independent inquiry,‖ consider any objections, and weigh ―the court‘s 
own concerns.‖205 If the settlement is ―unfair, unreasonable, or 
inadequate,‖ the court must reject it—even if it appears to ―garner[ ] 
overwhelming approval.‖206 The purpose of assigning this gatekeeping 
role to judges is, in part, to counter the agency issues discussed earlier in 
this Article. Indeed, without the judicial gatekeeping role, aggregation is 
arguably not a solution to the agency costs of corporate and securities 
litigation. It is, instead, another cost. 
Although appeals and objectors are not common,
207
 they provide an 
excellent opportunity for appellate courts.
208
 They create opportunities for 
 
 
 202. See Class Action Conflicts, supra note 27, at 829 (noting that district court dockets are 
crowded and even ―virtuous‖ judges have incentives to approve settlements); Under Cloak of 
Settlement, supra note 27, at 1122–30 (arguing that judges approve settlements to clear dockets); see 
also Judith Resnik, Managerial Judges, 96 HARV. L. REV. 374 (1982) (exploring the effects of judicial 
management). Ironically, district court judges also have an incentive to approve fewer settlements. If 
certain districts earn a reputation for careful scrutiny and additional demands before approval, they 
may see a decrease in the cases filed in their jurisdiction. See generally LYNN M. LOPUCKI, COURTING 
FAILURE (2005) (describing incentives of lawyers and courts in bankruptcy setting). 
 203. The Federal Judicial Center‘s recordkeeping may create perverse incentives to move some 
cases, class actions, too quickly. Noting the time on the docket, without a more substantive analysis of 
cases and their complexity, may contribute to settlement pressure and, thereby, increase agency costs, 
rather than supporting judges who want to be active gatekeepers. See Eric Helland & Jonathan Klick, 
The Effect of Judicial Expedience on Attorney Fees in Class Actions, 36 J. LEGAL. STUD. 171, 181 
(2007) (analyzing class action settlements and court congestion and finding higher attorneys‘ fees in 
congested courts); Jennifer K. Robennolt et al., Multiple Constraint Satisfaction in Judging, (Univ. of 
Ill. Pub. Law and Legal Theory Research Paper No. 08-22, 2008), available at http://ssrn.com/ 
abstract=1133184 (pointing to statistic-keeping and its potential for affecting decision-making). 
 204. Willging et al., supra note 26, at 97 n.83 and accompanying text. 
 205. Martens v. Smith Barney, Inc., 181 F.R.D. 243, 263 (S.D.N.Y. 1998). 
 206. Id.  
 207. See Elliott J. Weiss & John S Beckerman, Let the Money Do the Monitoring: How 
Institutional Investors Can Reduce Agency Costs in Securities Class Actions, 104 YALE L.J. 2053, 
2066 (1995) (stating that ―[o]bjectors are rare, and often only ‗straw objectors‘‖) and Theodore 
Eisenberg & Geoffrey Miller, The Role of Opt-Outs and Objectors in Class Action Litigation: 
Theoretical and Empirical Issues, 57 VAND. L. REV. 1529, 1550 (2004) on objectors. For information 
on appeals, see Willging et al., supra note 26, at 169–70. 
 208. Of course, appellate judges have mixed incentives as well. See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, What 
Do Judges Maximize? (The Same Thing Everybody Else Does), 3 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 1, 21 (1993) 
(describing ways in which appellate judges ―reduce their work‖ and ―avoid . . . politically sensitive 
issues‖). Financial journalists can also help by reporting on settlements and judicial scrutiny, or the 
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scrutiny, and, where appropriate, reversal, in accord with the principles in 
this Article. They also create opportunities for change—for a real impact 
on district court decision-making.
209
 And, even an abuse-of-discretion 
standard requires a finding that the settlement was ―based upon well-
reasoned conclusions [and] arrived at after a comprehensive consideration 
of the relevant factors.‖210 Judges care about their reputations211 and hate 
reversals.
212
 They are sensitive even to the possibility of a reversal. Thus, 
gatekeeping-by-reversal, or just the threat of it, can be a powerful 
 
 
lack thereof. Cf. Michael J. Borden, The Role of Financial Journalists in Corporate Governance, 12 
FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 311 (2007) (analyzing and proposing gatekeeping roles in policing fraud 
and other corporate wrongdoing for financial journalists). 
 209. See Christina L. Boyd, The Impact of Courts of Appeals on Substantive and Procedural 
Success in the Federal District Courts (2009) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Washington 
University), available at http://clboyd.net/dissertation (providing empirical evidence of impact of 
remands on outcomes). 
 210. In re Warner Commc‘ns Sec. Litig., 798 F.2d 35, 37 (2d Cir. 1986). For examples of 
settlement reversals, see, e.g., Synfuel Techs., Inc. v. DHL Express (USA), Inc., 463 F.3d 646, 652–55 
(7th Cir. 2006) (reversing the district court‘s approval of a settlement when the court failed to 
―adequately evaluat[e] its fairness‖); Staton v. Boeing Co., 327 F.3d 938, 959–78 (9th Cir. 2003) 
(reversing the district court‘s approval of a settlement when the court did not give sufficient concern to 
―the possibility that class interests gave way to self-interest‖ in the treatment of attorney‘s fees and 
named-plaintiff payments); In re Gen. Motors Corp. Pick-Up Truck Fuel Tank Prods. Liab. Litig., 55 
F.3d 768, 804–19 (3d Cir. 1995) (reversing a district court‘s ―too hastily approved‖ settlement); 
Holmes v. Cont‘l Can Co., 706 F.2d 1144, 1147–51 (11th Cir. 1983) (reversing district court‘s 
approval of a settlement when it failed to give ―careful scrutiny‖ of preferential treatment to named 
plaintiffs); see also In re Cmty. Bank of N. Va., 418 F.3d 277, 317–19 (3d Cir. 2005) (avoiding review 
of the settlement approval by remanding on other grounds, but still expressing concern that ―there is 
little in the record to give us confidence that the District Court exercised its fiduciary duty to assure 
that the settlement process was procedurally fair‖ or that the court ―gave the settlement and its unique 
characteristics the careful and comprehensive scrutiny required‖). 
 211. Barry Friedman, The Politics of Judicial Review, 84 TEX. L. REV. 257, 298 (2005). 
 212. A recent study of settlement practices following a strongly worded opinion in the Second 
Circuit reveals the power of the potential for reversal. In Goldberger v. Integrated Resources, Inc., the 
Second Circuit warned lower courts that if they did not actually engage in better scrutiny of fee 
requests, the chance of reversal would increase. Goldberger v. Integrated Res., Inc., 209 F.3d 43 (2d 
Cir. 2000). Post-Goldberger fee changes are small, but noticeable. There does appear to be a link 
between Goldberger and settlement size: fee requests and fee awards both increase at slower rates in 
cases with larger settlements. See Theodore Eisenberg et al., A New Look at Judicial Impact: 
Attorneys‟ Fees in Securities Class Actions After Goldberger v. Integrated Resources, Inc., 29 WASH. 
U. J.L. & POL‘Y 5 (2009). In the Eisenberg et al. study, the authors point out that the results are 
consistent with other possibilities, including institutional plaintiff activism. See generally Lawrence 
Baum, What Judges Want: Judges‟ Goals and Judicial Behavior, 47 POL. RES. Q. 749, 754 (1994). 
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incentive
213
 with significant outcomes.
214
 Similarly, lower courts who 
exercise their gatekeeping powers thoroughly should garner praise.
215
  
Finally, gatekeeping opinions can earn citations and recognition for the 
reversing court or the one affirmed, which is important to judges.
216
 
Consider Judge Rakoff‘s 2009 rejection of a proposed Consent Judgment 
between Bank of America and the SEC.
217
 The SEC charged Bank of 
America with fraud for representations in a proxy statement. The parties 
agreed to settle for $33 million, to be paid by the bank—though, actually, 
by its shareholders. Finding that the proposal was not ―fair, first and 
foremost, because it [did] not comport with the most elementary notions of 
justice and morality,‖ the Judge exercised gatekeeping rejection.218 The 
result was considerable media attention.
219
 Eventually, the court approved 
a $150 million settlement, but only after the parties revised the proposal.
220
 
This opinion, although unusual, makes the point: Judges who gatekeep can 
earn recognition for doing their jobs well. 
 
 
 213. Right now, reversals are rare. Willging et al., supra note 26, at 170 (reporting a 15 percent 
reversal rate in three districts studied and 6 percent in a fourth). 
 214. Recall that in Reynolds the remand went to a different court/judge, and the result was 
rejection of the settlement and a decision that the counsel was ineffective. After new counsel, 
discovery, and considerable time, a later settlement was approved. See supra notes 82–114 describing 
procedural history of Reynolds case. 
 215. The same sort of review with an affirmance in appropriate cases will provide an incentive to 
district judges as well—this one of the carrot sort. This sort of review, however, is likely to be rare 
because disapprovals leave the case pending, and, therefore, not final. See EEOC v. Pan Am. World 
Airways, Inc., 796 F.2d 314, 318 n.7 (9th Cir. 1986) (concluding that settlement disapproval decisions 
are not final decisions under section 1291 and are, therefore, not appealable).  
 216. As of February 25, 2011, the Reynolds case had been cited 774 times. The case is also 
included as a primary case on the topic of assessing the fairness of class action settlements in the 
leading casebook on class action law. See ROBERT H. KLONOFF ET AL., CLASS ACTIONS AND OTHER 
MULTI-PARTY LITIGATION 707 (2d ed. 2006). 
 217. SEC v. Bank of Am., 653 F. Supp. 2d 507 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (order denying proposed consent 
judgment). 
 218. Id. at 509.  
 219. From September 14, 2009, the date on which Judge Rakoff issued his opinion, to September 
16, 2009, a Westlaw media search returned 112 media reports on the decision. As of February 25, 
2011, a similar search produced 758 references to Judge Rakoff and the Bank of America judgment. 
See, e.g., Stephen Bernard, Judge Rejects Bonuses Deal; Bank of America, SEC to Go to Trial, 
BOSTON GLOBE, Sept. 15, 2009, at Bus. 6; Stephen Foley, Bank of America Faces Trial Over Bonuses 
„Lies‟, INDEP. (London), Sept. 15, 2009, at 34; Zachery Kouwe, Judge Rejects A Settlement Over 
Bonuses, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 15, 2009, at A1. But see Stephen M. Bainbridge & G. Mitu Gulati, How 
Do Judges Maximize? (The Same Way Everybody Else Does—Boundedly): Rules of Thumb in 
Securities Fraud Opinions, 51 EMORY L.J. 83, 95–97 (2002) (arguing that few judges on the lower 
courts have earned reputations for pushing agendas of any sort). 
 220. SEC v. Bank of Am., Nos. 09 Civ. 6829, 10 Civ. 0215, 2010 WL 624581 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 22, 
2010). 
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V. CONCLUSION 
This Article develops a construct of judges as gatekeepers in corporate 
and securities litigation, focusing on the settlement of these cases. The 
judges are the enablers of settlement, but are not allowed to grant approval 
unless they have done their jobs. Importantly, this Article points out that 
―doing their jobs‖ requires greater scrutiny of the role of defense counsel 
and insurers, both of whom amplify agency costs and contribute to 
collusive settlements. Yet, traditionally both academics and the courts 
have failed to analyze those issues in the context of the costs of aggregate 
and derivative litigation. 
The principles developed and explored in Part IV reveal that judges 
both have the power and incentives to control the agency costs by refusing 
to grant settlement approval in cases that do not meet the standards of Rule 
23. Moreover, the decision to grant, or refuse, approval is contingent on 
fulfilling their gatekeeping/fiduciary responsibilities. Adherence to the 
principles developed in this Article will help to ensure that judges are in 
fact functioning as the fiduciaries the law requires them to be.  
Active engagement and careful review are the basic hallmarks of 
judicial settlement gatekeeping. Without judicial approval, litigants cannot 
exit. There is no remedy. There are no fees. There is no preclusion. The 
power to grant all of these things is significant. The power to refuse it is as 
well. Fulfilling this role will create not only a ―better‖ settlement process, 
but also will result in better substance and outcomes.
221
  
Of course, judicial gatekeeping is not a complete solution to the agency 
problems in aggregate litigation. No single solution is. It is important to 
recall, however, that aggregate litigation itself provides a solution to gaps 
in the administrative state and the resulting agency issues. Gatekeeping 
judges can help to decrease collusion on all sides of the cases. The judicial 
gatekeeping construct in this Article provides a partial solution to the 
agency cost issues. It establishes the role and duties of the courts and 
 
 
 221. Judges have shown that they are well-suited to this task. For example, many of the reforms 
contained in the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act (PSLRA) were initially adopted (even if at 
the behest of defense attorneys) by entrepreneurial judges faced with crowded dockets and at least 
some specious cases. Thus, judges in the First and Second Circuits had pushed the pleading standard 
for scienter-based cases to increasingly high levels as a mechanism for combating the agency problems 
inherent in class actions. District courts within the First Circuit had also granted temporary discovery 
stays, pending the outcome of motions to dismiss that functioned like the statutory discovery stay 
enacted with the PSLRA. Creative judges can make similar innovations in establishing standards for 
settlement approval. 
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reveals how they can protect the authority of the system, the nature of the 
settlements, and the deterrence effects of the cases. In short, gatekeeping 
judges have an important role to play and this Article constructs and 
explicates that role. Now it is up to the judges. 
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